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Abstract 
International boundaries inherited from colonialism have given room to territorial 
disputes and the existing boundary conflicts in the West African Region, and are an 
endemic feature of Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbours. The thesis 
examines the 18 border disputes that Nigeria has been involved in since 
independence. 
The thesis begins by setting the scene in terms understanding Nigeria's foreign 
policy principles and objectives since independence and, in particular, its policy 
towards border disputes across the continent of Africa such as the Congo/Katanga, 
Uganda/Tanzania, Ethiopia/Somalia and Morocco/Algeria (chapter 2). The thesis 
then moves on to consider the underlying problems that have faced Nigeria as 
regards its borders as a result of colonisation (chapter 3 ). As the history is traced of 
the stages in the definition of Nigeria's boundaries, it becomes apparent that many 
border issues were unresolved or that decisions were made that were likely to be 
contested in the future. In Chapter 4 the thesis turns to a detailed examination of the 
border disputes that have arisen in the last 43 three years of independence between 
Nigeria and her close neighbours, Benin, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and 
Niger. 
Chapter 5 analyses the data provided. It finds that the way the dispute was handled 
was closely related to the regime type. Under the liberal democratic regimes of 
Balewa, Shagari and Obasanjo II, disputes were largely dealt with by diplomacy and 
negotiation. Whereas under the autocratic regimes of military leaders such as 
Generals Ironsi, Gowon, Muhammed, Obasanjo, Buhari, Babangida, Abacha's and 
Abubakar' s the disputes brought a response of a threat of force or aggressive use of 
force. It concludes that liberal democracy profoundly affects how border disputes 
are handled and is a force for peace and stability. It concludes that liberal 
democracy profoundly affects how border disputes are handled and is a force for 
peace and stability. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between regime type and the way 
they handled the border disputes between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours. In 
the cause of explaining this, several other issues are answered: (a) How does the 
nature of the regime that Nigeria is in dispute with affect how Nigeria handles the 
crisis? (b) How willing is Nigeria to use and abide by the decisions of the 
International Court of Justice and other similar mediation bodies? (c) Do the disputes 
help in identifying Nigeria' s foreign policy? (d) Which has been the most important 
border dispute between Nigeria and her close neighbours? 
The problems that Nigeria has with her immediate neighbours are generally not 
solved by military means (Interview, Aboubakar, 2002, and Hisseini, 2002). In part, 
this is because of her status in the sub-region and the role she plays within it. Nigeria 
treats the member states of the Economic Community of West Mrican States with 
respect. (Interview, Houndekindo, 2002, and Turay, 2002). Clearly, as many analysts 
have documented, Nigeria enjoys military superiority over its immediate neighbours 
(Imobighe, 1987). However, this fact does not lead Nigeria to disregard her 
neighbours and their common borders (Ate, 1992, p. 11, and Interview, Udoh, 2002). 
The disharmony between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours is truly paradoxical. 
Part of the explanation lies in historical claims that these neighbouring countries were 
parts of the present Nigerian territory. 
The old Oyo Empire was part of the present Republic of Benin; the Kanem-Borno 
Empire was part of the Republic of Chad; a sizeable component of Niger Republic 
was part of the Sokoto Caliphate while the present Southern Cameroon was part of 
Northern and Eastern Nigeria (until the referendum of 1961 in the case of the latter). 
Even today, the artificial boundaries separating the immediate neighbours overflow 
with similar peoples, cultures and aspirations (Interview, Oche, 2002). Because of 
these historical claims, Nigeria and her neighbours suffer insecurity (Akpan, 1973, p. 
121). 
A persisting sense of mutual insecurity is that, Nigeria, from her independence on 1 
October 1960, has demonstrated a total lack of interest in territorial expansion at the 
expense of her immediate neighbours. In addition, Nigeria has consistently pursued a 
policy of what it calls 'good-neighbourliness', towards her immediate neighbours 
(Interview, Wiah, 2002, Oche, 2002, and Sambo, 2002). Yet, to these neighbours, this 
disposition belies a potential threat to their territorial integrity. Moreover, Nigeria's 
immediate neighbours are very sensitive about their relations with Nigeria (Interview, 
Munir, 2002, and Ojukwu, 2002, Oche, 2002, and Peters, 2002). 
The problem ofNigeria and her immediate neighbours is, however, far more profound 
than in the manner conveyed by the preceding views. For, it touches on issues that 
are fundamentally and structurally related to the patterns of African territorial politics. 
The two African boundaries: the pre-colonial African boundaries and the boundary 
disputes in the post-colonial African will now be examined with reference to the 
border disputes. 
1. 1. The Pre-Colonial African Boundaries 
The idea of exclusive state jurisdiction and boundary autonomy, especially with its 
restrictive impact on people' s movement, was an alien phenomenon to Africans in 
1885. The "constant movement of population" was a characteristic of pre-colonial 
West African history (Ajayi, 1988, p. 2). Other historians and political geographers 
have stressed that African boundaries were neither formally defined nor were they 
delimited. Pre-colonial African boundaries, more usually, expanded or contracted as 
rulers gained or lost territories in the aftermath of wars. African rulers rarely 
maintained rigid boundaries as lines of human divide. In addition, just as there were 
no physical barriers to hinder population movements, the nature of state power was 
usually such as to be unable also to constitute effective barriers to population 
movement for too long a period (Ajayi, 1988, p. 2). For the European powers, 
however, the introduction of these legal ideas, and their enforcements, was a matter of 
practical necessity designed to regulate inter-imperial relations. The rationale, to 
them, was that the discovery and subjugation of distant lands and peoples by 
European explorers and conquerors produced numerous conflicting claims of 
sovereignty, jurisdiction and rights of trade and navigation, as well as problems of 
relations with indigenous peoples (Friedmann et al. 1969, p. 4). 
A substantial part of the boundary crisis of contemporary Africa, in light of the above, 
is the inheritance of these imperial legal norms as the basis of ordering inter-state 
relations. History has indeed demonstrated that Kwame Nkrumah was a more far-
sighted African nationalist leader than many of his contemporaries. Nkrumah was in 
favour of a long-term view of decolonisation, development and African unity, one that 
necessitated both political and economic integration as a strategy for overcoming the 
disadvantage of fragmentation under colonialism (Ate, 1992, p. 2). 
1. 2. The Boundary Disputes in the Post-Colonial Africa 
The boundary cnsts m post-colonial Africa has its roots in the partition of the 
continent by the European imperial powers in the nineteenth century. The 
consequence was the sudden termination of ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural and 
commercial affinities that cut across administrative boundaries in Africa, in order to 
accommodate imperial desires and norms. The transposition of European 
international state system gave legal sanctity to this new boundary order, new notions 
of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction of states. 
Although the creation of boundaries in Mrica by the colonial powers has been the 
source of boundary disputes in Mrica, other contributory factors to the border 
conflicts in the continent is regime type and their foreign policies. 
1. 3. Conclusion 
Post-colonial border conflicts in Africa generally, and in West Africa in particular, are 
illustrative of the imperial model superimposed on the continent. Traditionally, 
psychological and human imperatives define boundary driven ideas in Africa. The 
legal agreements negotiated and signed among the European powers could hardly 
restrain these, since these arbitrarily split linguistic, ethno-cultural, religious and 
ancient trading communities into micro 'modem' state enclaves serving neo-colonial 
needs. For example, the problem of cross-border smuggling (an aspect of the conflict 
between Nigeria and its immediate neighbours) thrives on the pre-colonial imperative 
of African trading life, which has survived the comparatively brief interlude of 
European superimposition. Long before the advent of colonialism a remarkable 
feature of African commercial life was the practice of long distance trade unhindered 
by administrative jurisdictions, involving "trafficking and exchange" of highly valued 
commodities "with strangers from other cultures" (Ajayi, 1988, p. 5). From this point 
of view, the solution to the harmful effect of smuggling does not lie in attempts to 
demarcate 'clearly' state boundaries in the sub-region. The solution lies in a new 
development strategy that aims primarily at integrating the individual trans-border 
communities into development units, free of the constraints of the legal frictions of 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity as bequeathed by colonialism. In order to 
understand the nature of the boundary disputes between Nigeria and her immediate 
neighbours, it is indeed appropriate to consider some approaches to the analysis of 
Nigeria's foreign policy. 
Chapter 2: Nigeria's Foreign Policy 
Although there is no sub field of political science that is completely self-contained, the 
study of foreign policy is somewhat unusual in that it deals with both the domestic 
and international arenas, moving from individual to state to systematic levels of 
analysis, and attempts to integrate all of these aspects into a coherent whole. Since at 
least the 1950s, though, researchers of foreign policy have tried to define an 
independent field of study that examines foreign policy (Gerner, eta/. 1994, pp. 91-
119). Reflecting the broad scope of analysis of such a discipline, the field of foreign 
policy analysis has been diverse and dynamic, with scholars pursuing an assortment of 
substantive topics through a variety of methodological approaches. Today, the study 
of foreign policy is quite diverse, as more and more voices enter the field and make 
their contributions towards the continuing goal of understanding and explaining 
foreign policy. The central focus of foreign policy analysis is on the intentions, 
statements, and actions of an actor often, but not always, state-directed towards the 
external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements, and 
actions. Beyond this, however, there is no consensus on how to define the field . 
Foreign policy analyses can be descriptive, evaluative, or analytical. Descriptive 
studies establish the facts regarding foreign policy decisions, policies declared 
publicly, actions taken, and the official and de facto relationships among state and 
non-state international actors. Foreign policy evaluation considers the consequences 
of foreign policy actions and assesses the desirability and achievability of the goals. 
This chapter does not offer a comprehensive coverage of approaches to the study of 
foreign policy, but it will examine two approaches to the study of foreign policy in 
detail. These are the traditional-classical approach closely identified as the 'Rational 
Actor Model ', and the Behavioural-Scientific Approach. It will then outline the basis 
of the approach used in this study. Using this approach, it examines the broad 
principles that have guided Nigerian foreign policy in general and border disputes in 
particular. 
2. 1. Analysis of Foreign Policy 
Several assumptions of the Realist School of International Relations form the basis of 
the traditional approach. The first is that states are assumed to be entities similar to 
'billiard balls ', whose movement is determined largely by the movement of the other 
balls, and contribute to various configurations in the international system. The second 
is that states are unitary actors, which decide, and act, with one voice for the 
attainment of national interests, the foremost being the security of the state. The third 
is the ' rational ' formulation of decisions. 
In the Behavioural Approach, foreign policy analysis has had a variety of forms. The 
overall premise of the foreign policy analysis is on the introduction of quantification, 
methodology, and empiricism. Unlike the first case, the Behavioural Analysis focuses 
on multiple causes as an explanation of the state's foreign policy behaviour. 
Within the Behavioural Approach, the study of domestic politics is a part of foreign 
policy analysis. Foreign policy is a border region between the international 
environment and domestic process, and between the two academic disciplines of 
political science and international relations. Therefore, the study involves the study of 
both the domestic political process and that of the international political process. To 
search for the determinants of foreign policy behaviour, there are several studies 
concentrating on various aspects of these two environments. Richard C. Snyder and 
his associates produced a groundbreaking study titled Decision-Making as an 
Approach to the Study of International Politics (Snyder, et al. 1962). 
The decision-makers acting in the name of the state direct state action. The focus is 
upon the "subjective" interpretations of the official decision-makers, rather than the 
"objective" interpretations of observer-analyst. Decision-makers, as participants in a 
system of action in an organisational context, act within the internal and external 
settings, which consist of "a set of categories of potentially relevant factors and 
conditions which may affect the action of any state" (Snyder, et a/. 1962). The three 
major factors determining the definition of the situation are competence, 
communications, information and motivation (Snyder, et a/. 1962). The official 
decision-makers take care of any influences from the setting of the decision-making 
process (Snyder, eta/. 1962). 
Whereas Snyder and his counterparts focused on the decision-makers subjective 
definition of the situation, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, in an attempt to define the 
relationship between the environmental factors and foreign policy decisions, focused 
their arguments on both psychological environment and operational environment 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990, pp. 67-70). Their unit of analysis is the "environed 
unit", be it an individual decision-maker, a society, rather than such abstract concepts 
as state (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990, p. 43). They identified five 
interrelationships between man and the environment, or what they called "milieu", 
that is, between the "pyschomilieu", and "operational milieu" : environmental 
determinism; free will environmentalism; environmental possibilism; cognitive 
behaviourism and environmental probabilism (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990, p. 
44). Cognitive behaviourism argued that operational factors are related to decision-
making when, the factors are perceived by decision-makers. The first step in linking 
the environmental factors into policy decisions, according to this view, is to establish 
how the given policy-makers conceive the milieu and how they interpret the 
opportunities and limitations implicit therein with respect to the end to be 
accomplished (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990, p. 49). 
However, unlike Snyder and his counterparts, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff contended 
that although the decisions are made by statesmen's perceptions of the milieu, 
"environmental determinism" must be taken into account, because the result of the 
decision will be affected by the conditions in the operational environment, regardless 
of whether or not the decision-makers are aware of them. Although the operational 
environment does not "determine" the decisions, it can "influence" them only through 
"cognitive behaviourism" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990, p. 44). Joseph Frankel 
argued that the objective environment is an important factor in the analysis of foreign 
policy decision-making. Although non-considered factors cannot influence the choice 
of the decision-maker, such factors may be important insofar as they set the limits to 
the outcome of their decisions (Frankel, 1963, p. 4). Frankel also points to individual 
factors, such as the values of the decision-makers. He argues that the assessment of 
environment is necessary in combination with the values held by the decision-makers, 
together with other elements internal to the individual, such as ideology, doctrines, 
objectives and purposes (Frankel, 1963, p. 111). 
James N. Rosenau went further and attempted to formulate pre-theories for foreign 
policy behaviour. Looking for the sources of foreign policy behaviour, Rosenau 
argued that a pre-theory of foreign policy comprises five central dimensions : 
idiosyncratic; role; governmental; societal and systemic. Idiosyncratic variables refer 
to the characteristics of decision-makers such as values, talents and prior experience. 
Individual roles refer to the behaviour of constraints upon officials irrespective of 
their idiosyncrasies. Governmental variables refer to those aspects of a government's 
structure that limit, or enhance, the foreign policy choices made by the decision-
makers. Societal variables refer to non-governmental aspects of major value 
orientation to a society, the degree of national unity and the extent of industrialisation. 
Systemic variables refer to any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise 
influence the choices made by officials (Rosenau, 1988, pp. 13-44). However, the 
extent to which these variables play a critical role depends on the size, the level of 
economic development and the type of political system of the country concerned. As 
a result, Rosenau proposed 120 pre-theories as an explanation of foreign policy 
behaviour. Furthermore, Rosenau introduced the concept of"issue-area", arguing that 
each issue-area may have a different political process and different variables 
(Rosenau, 1988, pp. 13-44). 
Arnold Wolfers, arguing that "single-factor theories" such as Marxism or the German 
School of Geopolitik are not satisfactory, proposed a combination of "pre-
dispositional-psychological determinants" and "environmental determinants" 
(Wolfers, 1962, p. 42). He contended that in the process of decision, or choice, 
elements of personality internal to the decision-maker merge with elements external to 
him. Wolfers argued that factors external to the decision-maker could be 
determinants only as they affect the hearts and wills of decision-makers (Wolfers, 
1962, p. 42). Environmental factors, on the other hand, operate through a prism, 
represented by the personality traits of the decision-makers that may deflect or distort, 
transform or reflect these environmental factors in a variety of ways, depending on the 
internal structure of the prism. 
Graham T. Allison, focusing on the domestic aspects of foreign policy decision-
making, placed two models alongside the Rational Actor Model in foreign policy 
analysis: the Organisational Process Model, (Model IT) and the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model (Model ill). According to Model IT, a decision is an output of organisational 
processes within the state since there are several organisations, each of which has a 
different set of standards, operating procedures and programs, each with different 
objectives and officials. According to Model Ill, on the other hand, during the 
decision-making process there emerges "pulling and hauling" among the bureaucrats. 
From this perspective, the output is an outcome of bargaining games and competitions 
among the official decision-makers. Influence in such a process will be reflected in 
the proposition that "where you stand depends on where you sit" (Allison, 1971, pp. 
13-18). 
The research design developed by Michael Brecher and his associates analysed 
foreign policy systems from the perspective of input-output flow (Steinberg and Stein, 
1969, pp. 75-101). Agreeing with "Cognitive Behaviourism", Brecher argued that 
decision-makers act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in direct 
response to that reality itself The "elite images" comprise a number of closely related 
perceptions of the external environment such as global systems, subordinate systems 
and bilateral systems; and of the internal environment such as military capability, 
economic capability, political structure, various interests groups and competing elites. 
Brecher also argued that all foreign policy issues belong to four overlapping issue 
areas: the military-security issue area, the political-diplomatic issue area, the 
economic-development issue area and the cultural-status issue area. The criterion for 
classifying the issue areas is "substantive content", that is, objective self-evident 
analysis and "motivational", that is, subjective analysis (Brecher, 1972, pp. 13-14). 
Finally, Brecher contended that there are two reasons for any inquiry into foreign 
policy: firstly to investigate the pressures flowing from the real and perceived 
environment leading to a choice among policy options and secondly the "outcomes of 
the decision". The investigation of the consequences of the decision or choice 
warranted both for particular issue and for the foreign policy system as a whole 
(Brecher, 1972, pp. 14-15). The attempts to create cohesive ' foreign policy theories' , 
there gave rise to a series of middle-range theories, one of which is crisis decision-
making (Hill, 1979, pp. 7-30). 
Brecher classified foreign policy decisions into two analytical groups. "Strategic" 
decisions are defined as "broad policy acts", measured by significance for the state's 
foreign policy system as a whole, duration of impact and the presence of a subsidiary 
cluster of decisions to operate that "policy"; "tactical" decisions, on the other hand, 
are those subsidiary clusters of decisions (Brecher, 1972, p. 14). 
A second classification is in accordance with the issues of concern to a foreign policy 
decision: a decision related to the realisation of economic, political, military, or 
security objectives of a country. Therefore, economic, political and military, or 
diplomatic grounds are bases for making decisions. Every decision brings about 
implications for the country and its concerned policy. For example, an economic 
embargo decision is a political/economic decision, through which a country seeks to 
achieve its political/economic objective(s) by the use of economic force. 
The third classification concerns the timing of the decision-making: 
First, there are decisions made under normal conditions within organisations and 
bureaucratic circles, known as "routine decisions"; the second type of decisions 
is the "crisis decisions" made under crisis conditions (Russet and Strarr, 1992, 
pp. 254-7; Hermann and Hermann, 1969, p. 363). 
Charles F. Hermann classified international cnses as situational variables and 
identified two approaches. From the international system approach, a crisis is "a 
situation that creates an abrupt and sudden change in one or more of the basic 
systemic variables" (Hermann and Hermann, 1969, pp. 21-4; 411-2). As for foreign 
policy decision-making, the crisis acts as a "stimulus", "responded to." by the 
decision-makers. A crisis is a situation that "threatens high priority goals of the 
recipient", "restricts the amount of time for response", and "surprises the decision-
makers" (Hermann and Hermann, 1969, p. 414). 
Due to these characteristics of the crisis, Hermann argued, there will be changes in the 
flow ofthe decision-making process: 
For example, extreme danger to "high goals" involves the highest, level 
governmental officials to make the decision; "shortage of time", causes 
circumvention of usual procedures; information about the situation 1s scarce 
(Hermann and Hermann, 1969, pp. 416-7). 
A foreign policy system, like all systems, consists of environment or setting, a group 
of actors, structure, and process. The design focuses on a number of inputs that flow 
into the decision-making machine, or decision-making process, which, in tum, 
produces decisions, or the output. Inputs to the system emerge from operational 
environment, or setting (Steinberg and Stein, 1969, p. 4), there are two sets of 
variables involved: external variables and internal variables. The environment 
"affects the results and outcomes of decisions-making" (Brecher, 1972, p. 4). That is, 
the decisions are filtered through the images of the decision makers. As the most 
important input to the foreign policy systems, the latter consists of an "attitudinal 
prism", made up of psychological predispositions and personality factors and an "elite 
image", made up of perceptions and interpretations of the environment (Brecher, 
1972, pp. 11-13). 
The two approaches are very important to the analysis of foreign policy as their 
arguments contain five principles. The first principle is that in order to make a 
decision, there should be a situation, or a problem, which stimulates the decision-
making process. The second principle is that decision-makers, as the decision-making 
unit, occupy the most significant place in the making of the decisions. The third 
principle is that the decision-makers act within two contexts, the operational 
environment or setting, which are the international system and the domestic system. 
Indeed, decision-makers stand as a linkage, or bridge, between these two systems. 
The fourth principle is that there is a decision-making process for making decisions. 
This involves flow of information, communication, and coordination among decision-
makers. The fifth principle is that every decision is concerned with an issue-area. 
Taking these arguments into account, the two approaches appear useful for our 
evaluation of the regimes' foreign policies in Nigeria and the border disputes between 
Nigeria and her close neighbours. Whether identified by decision-makers, or 
decisions made for certain purposes, different outcomes of a decision, results to 
decision-making process as feedback. 
2. 2. Analysis ofNigeria's Foreign Policy 
The question is, what is Nigeria's foreign policy? Nigeria has entered a momentous 
period in its history, with refreshing, dynamic leadership, as a nation vigorously 
asserting itself in the legitimate pursuit of its interests in world affairs, while 
galvanising its great potentials in constructive and purposeful action at home. Nigeria 
adheres to a policy of non-alignment as a firm guarantee of national indep~ndence, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and as an essential pre-requisite for a stable 
international order in which big and small nations, rich and poor, can make 
meaningful contributions. These important political principles have guided Nigerian 
authorities in matters on international boundaries (Interview, Sambo, 2002, and 
Peters, 2002). The purpose of this section is to present the objectives and principles 
of Nigeria's foreign policy; change of regimes; continuities of Nigeria's foreign 
policy; changes of Nigeria' s foreign policy and the pragmatics of Nigeria's foreign 
policy. It is important here to consider Nigeria's national interests before further 
discussions. 
2. 3. Nigeria's National Interest 
Nigeria's foreign policy is based on its internal cohesion and is influenced by the 
necessity to consolidate its independence and freedom, develop its national economy, 
review its social reconstruction and maintain its unity and stability. These national 
objectives are translated into national interests on the international scene as Nigeria's 
total commitment to African solidarity and cooperation in economic, social and 
cultural fields; non-interference in the internal affairs of other of states; opposition ~o 
colonialism, imperialism and racism; and desire for peace, security and prosperity in 
the world. In pursuing these national interests, Nigeria has declared that it has no 
territorial ambition or any intention to dominate or force its leadership on any other 
country. 
Nigeria's foreign policy has very clearly addressed the handling of issues such as 
border disputes. She has all along recognised the need for peaceful co-existence with 
her neighbours and has formulated policies that addressed these concerns, particularly 
in the areas of border disputes. Nigeria's foreign policy has therefore facilitated the 
handling of the border disputes with her neighbours, because it has set avenues for 
handling and resolving them (Interview, Sambo, 2002). Given her size, population, 
wealth and military might, in comparison with her immediate neighbours Nigeria 
could have resolved the border issues by force. Indeed, in some areas, the border 
conflicts have brought Nigeria to the brink of war with some of her immediate 
neighbours, but in almost all cases, she exercised maximum restraint and avoided 
unnecessary military hostilities. That is, she favoured negotiations and face-to-face 
discussions or arbitration. This means that Nigeria has demonstrated no territorial 
ambitions, but where there is a dispute, resorts to negotiations and arbitrations as the 
most favoured alternative (lntetview, Sambo, 2002). 
Nigeria in her international relations, particularly with her immediate neighbours in 
the sub-region, favours peaceful settlement of disputes in Africa, irrespective of the 
nature of the regime. Nigeria, a strong advocate of stability in the region, has sought 
to avoid being cast as the instigator of the instability in the region or sub-region. 
Nigeria was among the founding members of ECOW AS, a sub-regional organisation 
aimed, among other things, at the economic integration of the sub-region. The formal 
guidelines of Nigerian foreign policy, on the other hand, clearly stipulate, among 
other things, the promotion and protection of Nigeria' s national interest, the 
promotion of the economic and social welfare of Nigerians and the promotion of 
African integration and support for African unity (Interview, Sambo, 2002, and Wiah, 
2002). In this regard, one can clearly see that the institution of ECOW AS, in fact, 
serves the objectives ofNigeria' s stated foreign policy. 
2. 4. The Objectives ofNigeria's Foreign Policy 
The present stated objectives ofNigerian foreign policy are not different from those of 
the recent past. Nigeria's current constitution is the 1999 federal constitution. The 
foreign policy objectives reflected therein include, among other things, the promotion 
and protection of Nigeria's national interests while at the same time stressing the deep 
respect it has for international law and treaty obligations. Nigeria favours peaceful 
means of settling international disputes through negotiation, conciliation, arbitration 
and adjudication. Nigeria accords great importance to border issues (Interview, 
Sambo, 2002). Where there is a dispute or claim over a territory, Nigeria's policy has 
been and still is to favour peaceful negotiation and arbitration with a view to resolving 
the dispute or disputes. This policy, for example, has found expression in the setting 
up of an executive body-the National Boundary Commission (Interview, Wiah, 2002). 
Established many years ago, this institution seeks not only to settle the border disputes 
between the various states within the country with the aim of establishing acceptable 
state boundaries within Nigeria, but also takes up the international boundary disputes 
between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours. It is instructive to note that in many 
African countries, the past colonial masters left without clearly demarcating the 
international boundaries between states and, on attainment of independence, this issue 
became a problem for the newly independent states. 
Worse still, many countries experienced different colonial administrations and, 
regretfully, there were no adequate measures taken to handle the boundary issues 
between the states. On independence, these newly independent African countries had 
to face boundary demarcation problems early in their nation-hood. Nigeria, through 
the instrument of bilateral boundary commissions, seeks to resolve all outstanding 
international boundary issues. For instance, it has set up boundary commissions with 
the Republics ofNiger, Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Equatorial Guinea, with the aim 
of achieving mutually agreeable demarcation of their international boundaries through 
discussion rather than hostilities. Nigeria and her neighbours have held many bilateral 
meetings (Interview, Sambo, 2002). Over the years, public enlightenment campaigns 
among border communities have been successful as instruments and strategies of 
drawing attention to these issues and the primary need to resolve the boundary 
demarcation peacefully. There is no doubt that the national interest that emerged in 
support of these broad objectives reflects the objective of national cognitive self-
perception by the Nigerian foreign policy-makers. The definition, interpretation and 
elaboration of these objectives, interests and principles of Nigerian foreign policy 
should always be the over-riding concerns ofNigeria's leaders. 
The second stated objective is legal equality of states. The attractiveness of this 
objective to Nigeria is not simply in the situational context of de facto asymmetry in 
the structure of global inter-dependence that makes underdeveloped countries like 
Nigeria remain on the 'periphery,' susceptible to control and domination. Nigeria' s 
veneration for the principle of legal equality is a function of her belief and conviction 
that a well-ordered and peaceful community at both international and regional levels 
requires the mutual and reciprocal respect of actors. However, Nigeria has not 
interpreted the concept of legal equality of states to mean equal capacity of states for 
duties and responsibilities in the international system. This perhaps explains why, for 
instance, Nigeria has undertaken a large financial burden in supporting the annual 
budget of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and why 
Nigeria has been spending her resources to finance the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) (now the African Union, AU) and sponsored peacekeeping in Africa 
(Olusanya and Akindele, 1986, p. 3). 
The third objective is non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The 
commitment to this principle has sanctioned what in effect amounts to a restrictive 
interpretation of the country's national interest and definition of her effective security 
boundaries. As a dominant regional power in Africa, Nigeria's security boundaries 
are not coterminous with her territorial boundaries; the former extend beyond the 
latter. If, for instance, a conflict poses security problems for Nigeria, as it often does, 
why should the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of her neighbours 
be allowed to prevent Nigeria from protecting her security interests if need be? In 
support of the principle of non-interference by Nigeria in the domestic affairs of other 
states, there has been argument that Nigeria must consciously make a distinction 
between 'domination' and 'leadership' in her foreign policy behaviour in Black 
Africa. Otherwise, the francophone states in West Africa would use the threat to 
strengthen their economic and security dependence on France. 
The fourth objective is multilateralism, which explains not only Nigeria's enthusiastic 
and instinctive search for membership in key international organisations on both 
global and regional levels but also her support for and leadership in the establishment 
of some regional organisations. Believing that international organisations provide 
numerous opportunities for multi-lateral negotiations and collaboration among states, 
Nigeria has sought membership of the United Nations (UN) and its Specialised 
Agencies, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Olusanya, 1967, pp. 297-306). 
According to the fifth stated operating objective, Africa is the cornerstone and nerve-
centre of Nigeria's foreign policy. In recognition of the historical and geographical 
fact that Nigeria belongs to Africa and convinced of what late Azikiwe called "the 
historic mission and manifest destiny of Nigeria in Africa" (Zik, 1960, p. 71), 
Abubakar' s democratic regime made it clear that Africa must and would claim first 
attention in Nigeria's external relation and preoccupation. 
2. 5. Changes ofRegimes 
From 1960 to 1998, Nigeria at the national level witnessed twelve regimes. President 
Nnamdi Azikiwe and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966) led the first. General 
Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi (1966) led the second. General Yakubu Gowen (1966-1975) 
led the third. General Murtala Muhammed (1975-1979) led the fourth. General 
Obasanjo (1976-1979) led the fifth. Alhaji Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) led the sixth. 
General Muhamadu Buhari (1984-1985) led the seventh. General Babangida (1985-
1993) led the eighth. Ernest Shonekan (1993) led the ninth. General Sani Abacha 
(1993-1998) led the tenth. General Abubakar Abdulsalami (1998-1999) led the 
eleventh. The twelfth is the present regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo ( 1999-
2003). 
The changes of government might be expected to have led to changes in Nigeria' s 
foreign policy. Yet, changes in government do not necessarily mean changes in the 
content of a nation' s foreign policy. However, a change in leadership of government 
may lead to a change in style of diplomacy (Northedge, 1976, pp. 60-5). 
The history ofNigeria' s foreign policy divides into two major periods. With the civil 
war years as an interlude, the policy of civilian rule from 1960 until the coups of 1966 
can be described as ' conservative' and cautious. Nigeria was seen as a ' sleeping 
giant' . However, once the civil war was successfully completed and the huge 
revenues from the sale of petroleum began to pour in, Nigerian foreign policy became 
more 'active' , and even radical. It was not the content of the policy that changed but 
the behaviour and actions undertaken to support policy that changed (Delancey, 1976, 
pp. 39-53). 
How has the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy objectives and principles been 
affected by changes of regimes and heads of states? From the democratic regime 
Balewa, Shagari to Obasanjo, Nigeria has always made it clear in her foreign policy 
pronouncements and actions that: 
In spite of her comparative advantage of size, population and resources over 
many countries in Africa, particularly in West Africa, Nigeria would seek to 
neither dominate other countries nor carry out aggressive military action against 
them. Various Nigerian leaders recognise Nigeria' s so-called "manifest destiny" 
to lead Africa (Baker, 1984, p. 78). 
On commg to power m 1966, Major-General Johson Aguiyi Ironsi explained 
Nigeria's role in Africa like this: 
In the whole sphere ofNigeria's external relations, the government would attach 
the greatest importance to our African policy. We are aware that because of our 
population and potential, the majority opinion in the civilised world looks to us to 
provide responsible leadership in Africa. Moreover, we realise that we shall be 
judged, largely, by the degree of success or failure with which these expectations 
are thrown on us. We are convinced that whether in political, economic, or 
cultural spheres, our destiny lies in our role in the continent (Stremlau, 1977, p. 
3). 
This view ofNigeria's manifest destiny has been, maintained by successive Nigerian 
leaders. In 1979, Shagari made the same statement: The destiny ofNigeria is linked 
with the fortunes of all the countries in Africa and all the peoples of African descent 
abroad" (Tijani and Williams, 1981, p. 91). In spite ofNorthedge's views, Nigeria's 
foreign policy during General Obasanjo 's regime changed from the conservative and 
moderate policies of the Balewa and Shagari regimes. According to Olajide, Aluko's 
"patience, pragmatism and caution had virtually ceased to be Nigeria's diplomacy" . 
He added, "The Federal military government has adopted a radical militant style in 
the conduct of external relations" (Olajide, 1976a, pp. 409-11). The 'new' style 
placed great emphasis on Nigeria's African foreign policy. 
General Obasanjo, in his address to the Senior Army Officers' Training Seminar in 
Ibadan on 17 January 1976, declared: "Nigeria has often appeared to be sitting on the 
fence of important issues, much to the detriment of our image and interest especially 
in Africa" . According to him, this is a reflection of lack of purpose and inability to 
identify what constitutes Nigeria's national interest. Obasanjo further proclaimed that: 
"One ofthe objectives on foreign affairs of his military government was to create 
the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the 
world in order to facilitate the defense of the independence and territorial 
integrity of all African countries" (Garb a, 1976, p 21 ). 
His declaration implied heavy criticism of the foreign policy posture of the previous 
governments. The above explanations indicate that the successive regimes and 
personalities shared similar views on the continent of Mrica. 
2. 6. Continuities ofNigeria's Foreign Policy 
There is an element of continuity in Nigeria's foreign policy, in that all of the regimes 
subscribe to good neighbour relationships in Mrica. What has varied is how the 
successive regimes interpreted these principles and the extent to which other intra-
and-extra-Nigerian events shaped the execution of these principles (Ogunbadejo, 
1980, p. 765). From 1960 up to 1966, Nigeria's foreign policy was quiet and 
conservative, with political leaders content to remain within the evolving neo-colonial 
framework. This period was also one dominated by domestic upheaval, with the 
breakdown of the Westminster system prior to 1966, the coups and civil war in the 
latter half of that decade, and the period of reconciliation and readjustment in the early 
1970s. 
The change in the level of commitment to foreign policy initiative was more 
accentuated in 1975, following the removal from power of Yakubu Gowen by 
Murtala Mohammed. The buoyant economy and the desire to play a role in 
international affairs commensurate with the country's perceived strength provided the 
impetus for a radical shift in the content. This indicates that the availability of oil 
revenue in the 1970s had a considerable impact on Nigeria's foreign policy options 
(Bolaji, 1979, pp. 150-168). However, detailed assessment ofthe claim that Africa is 
the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy occurs in chapter five, within the 
examination of the foreign policy of the regimes and heads of state in relation to their 
roles in the border disputes between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours. 
Again, during the invasion of Nigerian territory by Cameroonian gendarmes that 
resulted to the death offive Nigerian soldiers in May 1981 , Shagari's government was 
pressurised by the Nigerian army to respond militarily to the killings. However, 
Shagari resisted the pressure not because his government lacked the capacity to 
resolve the issue militarily but because he preferred to use a peaceful solution to the 
conflict. In March 1983, when the damming of Kalia River in Cameroon reduced the 
flow of water to Borne State in Nigeria the fears that the River Benue would be 
dammed prompted Nigeria to take the issue to the International Court of Justice. 
Meanwhile, Olusegun Obasanjo's present regime is trying to establish good 
relationships with Nigeria's immediate and distant neighbours. Although we have 
observed Nigeria's foreign policy posture in Africa, it is possible that the conduct of 
the foreign policies of the regimes and heads of state in the continent have never been 
constant since independence. Aspiration is one thing and its achievement is another. 
There are differences in their approach to the political problems in Africa (Olajide, 
1977b, pp. 163-195; Williams and Turner, 1978, pp. 132-172). The scope of the 
thesis, of course, does not cover all cases in Africa, but selected cases (Shaw and 
Aluko, 1983, pp. 182-3). 
2. 7. Pragmatics ofNigeria's Foreign Policy 
All Nigerian regimes and heads of state have, since independence, been complying to 
with the OAU principles in the interests of peace and order in Africa. To some extent, 
Nigeria is an important mediator in African disputes such as the Congo crisis, the 
disagreements between Uganda and Tanzania, the Chadian crisis, the Ghanian crisis, 
the Liberian and Sierra Leonian crises, the confrontation between Ethiopia and 
Somalia, and the Morocco and Algeria disputes. 
2. 8. Nigeria and the invasion in Benin 
Under General Muhammed regime, after the unexpected mercenaries' attack on Benin 
on 16 January 1977, Nigeria issued an unequivocal condemnation of that "barbaric 
and senseless act of aggression against a sovereign and progressive African state" 
(Federal Ministry of Information, 1977). Nigeria's condemnation revealed her sense 
of outrage over an invasion that took place at a time when several African heads of 
states were in Lagos for the official opening of the second black cultural festival 
(FESTAC). At the request of the Benin authorities, a military co-operation agreement 
was negotiated between Nigeria and Benin and signed in Lagos in April 1978. That 
agreement made provision for the training ofBenin's military personnel in Nigeria's 
defence institutions and fur a joint patrol by their armed forces of their common 
borders (Mohammed, 1983, pp. 10-11). Nigeria's foreign policy posture towards the 
invasion in Benin shows that she wanted to maintain good relations with Benin. 
2. 9. Nigeria and the Congo Conflict 
First, the following questions need addressing: Did the regime and head of state in 
Nigeria, during the Congo dispute, support the Katanga secession? How did Nigeria 
react to the secession? What were the principles that guided the action Nigeria took 
against the Katanga secession and why? Has Nigeria's African foreign policy 
changed due to changes of regime and head of state? 
History holds that Nigeria never supported the secession in Katanga. Nigeria did not 
take any side because of her desire to uphold the legality and constitutionality of the 
Congo. Nigeria's government wanted a united Congo and to preserve the territorial 
integrity of Congo. Equally important was Nigeria's fear of the revelation of the 
fragility of the African system. However, Nigeria's government only advised for the 
settlement of the dispute, based on respect for the charter of the United Nations. The 
Nigerian government sincerely took a moderate position; worked for the solutions to 
the crisis and later gave full support to the actions and decisions that were agreed 
upon by the United Nations. Nigeria's foreign policy posture to the Congo dispute 
also emphasised the Nigerian government's principle of non-interference in another 
country's internal affairs. We can conclude the argument by saying that Nigeria's 
policy was primarily concerned with the preservation or restoration of the territorial 
status quo in Congo. 
2. 10. Nigeria and the Tanzania and Uganda Dispute 
When President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania participated to the fall of Field Marshal 
Idi Amin ofUganda's regime in November 1978, Nigeria insisted that ifNyerere was 
allowed to get away with that without any reaction by African states, then that would 
lead to interventions by African states in the affairs of other African states (Margaret, 
1981, p. 10). Nigeria's reaction to that dispute is comparable to the reaction of the 
international community to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1991. Nigeria criticised 
the participation of Tanzanian troops in the fall of Idi Amin's regime. Nigeria, 
subsequently, refused to grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime. The 
Nigerian government's reaction to this dispute was very strong. In 1979, Nigeria 
closed down her High Commission in Kampala. That was, partly, to save the lives of 
the Nigerian diplomats in Uganda and partly as a gesture against Tanzania' s military 
involvement in the overthrow ofldi Arnin. 
The Nigerian government's reaction to that dispute shows her commitment to the 
OAU principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and her 
respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of member states. 
Much as the Nigerian leaders disliked Amin, they believed Nyerere was an adventurer 
who was determined on establishing his hegemony over Uganda, East and Central 
Africa (May, 1998, p. 8). Nyerere's involvement of his troops in Rwanda and Uganda 
confirmed these fears about his goals in East Africa in general. As far as the Nigerian 
government was concerned, Nyerere's approach to African problems was intolerable. 
These values and principles shaped Nigeria's position during the Tanzanian and 
Ugandan dispute of 1978-1989. 
2. 11 . Nigeria and the Chadian Conflict 
In the Chadian dispute, Nigeria played a significant role in ending hostilities among 
the internal factions . On 25 February 1979, Nigeria called for a reconciliation 
conference and offered to host it in Kano. A few days later followed the decision to 
send the Nigerian peacekeeping force to the Chadian capital, with the support of 
Egypt. The first contingent of the Nigerian peacekeeping force, which was about 
eight hundred in number, arrived in Chad on 10 March 1979, with a further thousand 
expected to follow. However, misconception dogged Nigeria in her principal 
mediation effort and so she was judged to be an interventional power conspiring 
against Chad' s independence (Biiijtenhuijs, 1987, pp. 123-6). The intervention force 
and the Kano conference were viewed with scepticism "in political circles" in 
N'Djamena (Nolutshungu, 1996, p. 94). In N 'Djamena, their French colleagues 
(Nolutshungu, 1996, pp. 123-5) treated the Nigerian peacekeeping force in an 
unfriendly manner. The objectives of the Nigerian troops were not certain as claimed, 
but limited to ensuring the observance of the ceasefire and to permiting free 
movement in the city. It is arguable that Nigeria had an independent diplomacy of its 
own, national conceptions of its African role, and an idea of national reconciliation 
grounded in its own experience, all of which made Nigeria a dependable ally. Unlike 
Sudan and Egypt, she was the sincere preference of the Chadian factions. 
2. 12. Nigeria and the Liberian Conflict 
Nigeria' s assumption of the lion's share of the political and economic costs in West 
Africa has been impressive. In 1990, as the crisis in Liberia escalated, there was a 
need for security. Four factors determined Nigeria's role. Firstly, there was a close 
personal relationship between General Babangida of Nigeria and Liberia's leader, 
Samuel Doe. Secondly, America's refusal to intervene, preferring instead to visit 
Monrovia to evacuate the American citizens. Thirdly, the dispute spiralled refugee 
problems in Sierra Leone, Ghana, The Gambia, Guinea, and Ivory Coast. The fourth 
was the lack of OAU initiative. The fifth was French economic interest in West 
Africa, and Paris' support for Charles Taylor encouraged Nigeria to see herself as a 
bridge in this residual colonial divide. Taking Nigeria's position in West Africa into 
account, Babangida apparently involved Nigerian troops (in the form of the Nigerian 
Police Force Line (NPFL) from the onset of the Liberian dispute. In respect of her 
attitudes towards the Liberian crisis, Nigeria adopted a diplomatic approach by going 
through ECOWAS to intervene between Doe' s government and Charles Taylor' s 
forces. Nigeria, accordingly, convened the standing mediation committee, the 
ECOMOG, an ECOW AS inner circle, to act in the dispute and find a settlement to the 
dispute. 
Given its extensive military and diplomatic intervention in the pre-1997 Liberian civil 
war, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) remained engaged 
in diplomatic efforts to address the Liberian crisis. Several meetings were organised 
by the ECOW AS Mediation and Security Council in order to discuss the Liberian 
issue. In March 2002, ECOW AS hosted a peace meeting in Ahuja, Nigeria, that was 
attended by representatives of the Liberian government and political opposition 
groups. 
With the recent crisis in Liberia in 2003, President Obasanjo ofNigeria made a trip to 
Monrovia in July 2003, and made an asylum offer to President Charles Taylor of 
Liberia. On 11 August 2003, President Taylor turned over the reins of power to his 
vice-president, Moses Blah, and boarded a Nigerian plane for the southern state of 
Calabar of Nigeria, where he began his life in exile. This move by Nigeria can be 
seen as a necessary step to end the bloodbath in Africa's oldest republic and the 
asylum should be considered on humanitarian grounds as being in order to save the 
Liberian people from fighting as well as to save the peace process in Liberia. 
2. 13 . Nigeria and the Sierra Leonean Conflict 
In February 1998, the military wing of the Economic Community of West African 
States, ECOMOG, once again, led by Nigeria, launched a military attack that led to 
the collapse of the reble forces and its expulsion from Freetown. On 10 March 1998, 
President Kabbah was returned to office. The Security Council terminated the oil and 
arms embargo and strengthened the office of the Special Envoy to include UN 
military liaison officers and security advisory personnel. The mission monitored and 
advised efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's security forces. 
Fighting continued with the rebel alliance gaining control of more than half of the 
country. In December 1998, the alliance began an offensive to retake Freetown and in 
January 1999 overran most of the city. In the same month, ECOMOG troops retook 
the capital and again installed the civilian government. 
Negotiation between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999 and on 7 July 
all parties to the conflict signed an agreement in Lome to end hostilities and form a 
government of national unity. On 22 October 1999, the Security Council authorised 
the establishment ofUNAMSIL, a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 
6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the government 
and the parties in carrying out the decisions of the Lome peace agreement. To head 
the new mission, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji (Nigeria) as 
his Special Representative in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 2003). Nigeria' s 
commitment to democracy in Sierra Leone and its leadership of ECOMOG is an 
enhancement of her sub-regional potential rather than an erosion of it. 
2. 14. Nigeria and the Ethiopia and Somalia Dispute 
In 1964, Ethiopian and Somali forces clashed in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. In 
1972, tension between the two countries increased along their border. In July 1977, 
Somalia attacked Ethioipia across the Ogaden Desert in pursuit of its irredentist 
claims to the ethnic Somali areas of Ethiopia (UNDP, 2000). In March 1978, Somali 
forces retreated into Somalia. In 1982, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia along their 
common border. 
The border dispute between the two neighbours is based on the fact that neither 
Somalia nor Ethiopia respects the political boundaries drawn by the British, French, 
and Italian colonies. Since independence, successive Somali governments had sought 
to reincorporate those Somalis living in Ethiopia into Greater Somalia. Nigeria 
chaired the OAU ad hoc commission, which advocated the restoration of peace 
between Somalia and Ethiopia on the basis of respect for colonial boundaries (Shaw 
and Aluko, 1983, p. 42). President Siad Barre of Somalia and the forces loyal to him 
took political asylum in Nigeria and he died in exile in Nigeria (United States Institute 
ofPeace, 2003). 
2. 15. Nigeria and the Ghana Conflict 
On 15 May 1979, Flight-Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings organised a confrontation between 
officers and men to get the bad elements that had led Ghana into ruin. The first 
actions taken by Rawlings and his men were the executions on 16 July of 
Acheampong and Utuka, followed by the executions of six more military men 
including General Akuffo and Mrifa, and three former heads of state. The executions 
continued, and up to 100 senior officers and businessmen were tried in camera by 
impromptu People's Courts. Heavy sentences were publicised, as were the declared 
assets of several top military men, including some of those already executed. 
International repercussions followed, the most painful was the cutting off by Nigeria 
of the crude oil supply to Ghana, thereby deprived Ghana of 80 per cent of crude oil 
imports from Nigeria which caused a severe shortage of oil in Ghana (Yedder, et a/. 
1983-84, p. 37). 
2. 16. Nigeria and the Moroccan and Algerian Dispute 
Morocco laid claims to western sections of southern Algeria, particularly in the 
Tindouf area where large deposits of iron ore are located. Morocco's claim is based 
on the historical argument that the territories had been part of Morocco in pre-colonial 
times. Between July and October 1962, Morocco launched attacks on Algeria in this 
area. Again, between September and November 1963, Morocco attacked Algeria in 
the same place (Huth, 1996, p. 221). Morocco's interest in the mineral resources of 
Tindouf was undoubtedly a factor influencing Morocco's policies in its dispute with 
Algeria, but the Moroccan territorial claims also had much deeper and more extensive 
roots. The mere location of the line drawn by France just to the west of the rich 
Tindouf area was only one factor among many and not even the most salient. More 
basic reasons, social and political, rather than geographic, explain the border dispute 
between the two countries (Touval, 1972, p. 26). Nigeria's diplomacy was very active 
in this dispute. Between 1977 and 1978, Nigeria approached the Soviet Union and the 
various African countries that were involved in the conflict without success. 
Although it was clear that Nigeria's diplomacy was unable to prevent the dispute from 
developing between the two countries. Nigeria's move provided some momentum to 
the restoration of peace between Morocco and Algeria. 
2. 17. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that successive Nigerian governments have been 
faithful to the principles governing Nigeria's African policy laid down at the start of 
its independence. Every example of intention in the disputes has shown the consistent 
use ofNigeria's support for African unity and Nigeria's interest in Africa (Webber 
and Smith, 2002, p. 3). Nigeria's roles in those African conflicts have shown that a 
medium power state can act cooperatively to provide solutions for Mrican problems. 
What has been demonstated on the broad foreign policy point will later be applied to 
the narrower issue ofborder disputes (Figures 4. 1, 4. 2, XXX, andY). 
Chapter 3: The Creation of Nigeria's Boundaries 
This chapter explores the processes that took place in the delimitation of Nigeria' s 
international boundaries and describes the various boundary alignments that altered 
the shape and area of the country. The importance of defining Nigeria' s boundaries 
literally on paper, on maps and on the ground cannot be over emphasised. Without 
these processes, especially the last one, adjacent territories may be making claims and 
counter claims after realising that their resources have fallen to the other party. In 
executing all these processes, the map is very important in the allocation ofterritories 
and description of their limits. This explains that after surveys and during the 
demarcation of the boundaries, the signed map is needed to show the course of the 
boundary in relation to the natural landmarks around it. The issues that form the 
framework for our analysis in this chapter are: stages in the definition of Nigeria's 
boundaries, allocation and map-based description of Nigeria's boundaries, ground-
based delimitation survey and mapping ofNigeria' s boundaries, ground translation of 
Nigeria' s boundaries shown on the map, the scheme of the definition of Nigeria' s 
boundaries, the Nigeria-Benin boundary, the Coast to Latitude go North, Latitude go 
North to the River Niger, the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary, the pre-war Nigeria-
Cameroon boundary, the Sea to Cross-River rapids, the Cross-River to Yola Arc, the 
Yola Arc to Chad, the Post-War Nigeria-Cameroon boundary and the Nigeria-Chad 
boundary. 
3. 1. Stages in the Definition ofNigeria's Boundaries 
Boundary definition provides limits to a property, defining the area wherein the owner 
can operate without being accused of transgression. Furthermore, boundaries provide 
a unit or units of cartographic representation which can be defined in three stages 
namely (a): allocation, (b) delimitation and (c) demarcation (Jones, 1945, p. 57). 
These stages can be modified as follows: allocation and map-based description, 
ground-based delimitation survey and mapping, and ground translation of the 
boundaries shown on the map (demarcation). 
3. 2. Allocation and Map-Based Description 
A major milestone in the Scramble for Africa of the 19th century was the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-1885, at which rules were drawn up, the application of which 
ultimately led to the partition of Africa and the resultant allocation of territories to 
various European countries. At the time of the Conference, in which British claims to 
the territory adjacent to the Gulf of Guinea were recognised, the Lagos area was about 
the only part of Nigeria with which the British colonial administrators were familiar. 
With respect to the other parts, they laid claims before acquiring them. 
Two years after the Berlin Conference, Justus Perthe published the map of Africa 
titled Spezial Karte von Africa (Special Map of Africa). This German map later 
served as the map on which the descriptions of boundaries of most of the allocated 
territories were based. The map annexed to the convention of June 14, 1898 between 
Great Britain and France composed of Sections IV and V of the 1892 edition of Justus 
Perthe's map. This map indicated all Nigerian boundaries except the section from 9° 
N to River Niger of the Western boundary. Furthermore, the depiction of all the 
boundaries with straight lines and arcs made them easy to describe textually. During 
these processes, the boundary that runs from Niger to Chad was the longest boundary 
line in Nigeria before the First World War. Compare the following description for 
illustration of its simplicity: 
From Giri the boundary follows the midway of the Niger as far as the mouth of a 
dry watercourse supposed to be Dalul Mauri. It follows the watercourse till it 
meets the circumference of a circle drawn from the centre of the town of Sokoto, 
with a radius of 100 miles. It follows the northern arc of this circle until it 
intersects the 14th parallel for the second time. It then follows the 14th parallel 
for 70 miles; then descends due South to latitude. 13° 20' North; then eastward 
along this parallel for a distance of 250 miles; then regains the 14th parallel, and 
follows it as far as meridian, passing 3 5' east of Kuka and ultimately this 
meridian southward, till its intersection with the southern shore of Lake Chad 
(Ravenstein, 1898, pp. 73-5). 
Figure l.Niger to Lake Chad boundary in 1898 (straight lines and arc) 
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Source: J. Thompson. 1886. Niger and Central Sudan Sketches. Scottish Geog. 
Magazine, 2 [no volume] [no number], [no page]. 
See Figure 3. 1, for the illustration of the frontier described above. Obviously, one 
can observe the use of perfect geometrical shapes: straight horizontal and vertical 
lines and arc described from Sokoto. The only surveyed section delineated with an 
irregular line is the section of the boundary running along the Dalul Mauri River. 
Where boundary courses followed natural linear features such as big rivers, or crests 
of long ridges, map-based description can be as good as description based on surveys. 
The only problems here are: (a) in order to place such natural boundary lines on the 
map, their positions need fixing; (b) some natural boundary lines had in the past left 
boundary commissions confused because they were ambiguous. For example, a 
boundary line defined by a river or a lake could change with tides or seasons as in the 
case of the border from Y ola to Chad during the survey of the boundary from Y ola to 
Chad in 1902, and (c) basing descriptions on maps whose authenticity is still doubtful 
with most geographical features wrongly located or named. If its foundation in the 
form ofthe map was shaky, on-the-map descriptions often faced the threat of absolute 
collapse. No wonder then, descriptions not based on detailed on-the-ground surveys 
were only to guide boundary commissioners in the delimitation survey work. 
Sometimes they made the work of the surveyor more tedious, especially when they 
had to be looking for features mentioned in the description but which, in the real 
world, did not appear close to the boundary on the ground. 
As vague as map-based description of boundaries is, at least it had provided a frame 
with which the colonial administration could work. The allocation of territories and 
map-based descriptions of boundaries were included in the treaties that were procured 
between, and signed by, concerned parties several years before the delimitation 
surveys (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989, p. 182). The process was a temporary measure 
pleasing to the European Powers who had gained some territories but inconvenient for 
the indigenes living around the boundaries. Evidently, the indigenes were not aware 
of what had transpired at the Berlin Conference and carried on their normal duties 
without taking note of any artificial barriers that, of course, were not visible (Asiwaju 
and Adeniyi, 1989, p. 182). Considering that language plays a significant role in 
transactions, we can now argue that communication between the colonial masters and 
the indigenes was the major obstacle, as the two parties did not find it easy to 
communicate with each other. Even the translators might have found the original 
concepts difficult to reproduce. At this point, the extension of the European influence 
and the colonial government to the boundary area introduced constraints that caused 
friction along the boundaries. That was what made the next stage of the cartographic 
definition urgent. 
3. 3. Ground-Based Delimitation Survey and Mapping 
Delimitation simply means the setting of the edge or the limit at which something 
ends. Map-based description is therefore a form of delimitation, even though it is not 
definite, not concrete and not realistic as in the case of delimitation survey and 
demarcation. There are three stages to the carrying out of Ground-based delimitation: 
(a) reconnaissance; (b) survey, and (c) mapping. While the map-based description 
was done on the map without necessarily taking the people to the area around the 
frontier, delimitation, reconnaissance and survey took the people to the boundary area. 
Reconnaissance, by definition, involves visiting the boundary area, identifying the 
objects mentioned in the map-based description and observing the characteristics of 
such objects to see if they were permanent enough to be used in defining a boundary. 
The reconnaissance party looks for some other features that can be used as reference 
points in the boundary survey that will follow. These activities in fact involve 
clearing obstacles such as trees, bushes around the boundary and, if possible, 
establishing temporary beacons that make survey work easier (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 
1989, p. 185). During reconnaissance, many alterations are often made to the 
boundary line defined by the textual description. In the case of Nigerian boundaries, 
for instance, compromises were reached in order to re-unite villages or villagers and 
their lands separated by the provisional boundary lines. 
Again, the delimitation survey methods and procedures were specified in the treaty 
relating to territorial allocation. Survey is necessary in rendering the boundary line 
into mappable data. This aspect of boundary definition is more important than any 
other stage, including boundary demarcation. Without the delimitation survey, this is 
simply a process of partitioning and the frontier cannot be accurately represented on 
the map that usually accompanies the agreement signed by the two parties. In 
addition, if the delimitation is done on a map without a proper survey, it will be 
difficult to draw an accurate boundary, as map-based descriptions have demonstrated. 
In the early years of colonial rule in Nigeria, boundary surveys provided the most 
accurate cartographic data for the mapping of the country, and the area surrounding 
the boundary was properly surveyed (Winterbotham, 1928, pp. 173-186). In a 
country like Nigeria that was, in the early decades of the 20th century, unable to 
develop a cartographic data base, provision of control data constitutes a part of the 
boundary survey and took a considerable portion of the time spent on the whole 
survey. In most cases, the boundary commissions found it necessary to relate 
boundary lines to permanent structures such as the rulers' palaces in some big towns. 
Up until the time the two Nigerian Protectorates were amalgamated and the Nigeria 
Survey Department created, the boundary commissioners were appointed by the 
Colonial Office (Winterbotham, 1928, p. 186). 
However, the conduct of the delimitation surveys was guided by relevant clauses in 
the agreement respecting the boundary in question. Where alterations in the 
agreement were made in favour of the British government during the delimitation 
survey or where the boundary description in an agreement was conformed with, 
British Commissioners used their discretion. Controversial issues, especially those 
that deviated adversely from the wordings of the agreements, were referred to the 
Intelligence Division of the War Office and the Colonial Office for advice and 
directives. One would expect a similar procedure in the case ofthe other party. 
Evidently, the boundary surveys were conducted with a view to making maps ofthe 
boundary accompany the agreements signed by both parties. Such maps provided 
documents, which as later developments along the boundaries revealed, were more 
permanent than the objects, such as the beacons and pillars used in demarcation, 
which had often disappeared. The maps showed the course of the frontier, 
topography, drainage, geology and the settlements within the area around the 
boundary. Such maps were produced at different scales, the most common of which 
were 1:500,000, 1:250,000 and 1:200,000 depending on the length of the boundary in 
question. For instance, a scale of 1:200,000 may be favourable for the northern 
boundary of Nigeria (River Niger to Chad) whereas this scale may be too small for the 
Nigeria-Benin boundary. 
A boundary line on a map is only valid insofar as it can be identified on the ground. 
This is where textual description comes onto the scene again. This time, it is not the 
narrative concerning the lines drawn on a map. Rather, it is the description of the 
survey points and the courses on the ground. For example, the arc described in the 
Y ola-Chad section of Nigeria's eastern boundary has its centre in Y ola. At the scale 
used for the maps produced, Yola could only be shown in a much-generalised manner. 
The textual description shows the exact point in Y ola that served as the centre of the 
arc. The textual description, which was based on surveys, was done in steps using 
series of straight lines except where there was a river forming part of the boundary. 
The Nigeria-Benin boundary from the coast to the middle of the River Niger, a 
distance of696 kilometres, was described in sixty-five steps. 
In the demarcation exercise that followed the delimitation survey, the use of textual 
description in addition to maps was found to be immensely helpful. In fact, the 
Anglo-French agreement on the Nigeria-Dahomey (Benin) boundary of 19 October 
1906 included a clause that stated: "in the event of any divergence being found 
between the line as described above and as indicated on the maps, the description 
shall be held to be authoritative" (HMS Office, 1906, p. 12). 
3. 4. On-the-Ground Translation ofBoundaries shown on the Map 
Boundary surveys usually produce data for maps that show the boundary line as a part 
of the treaty to be signed by interested parties. However, nothing forestalls boundary 
disputes if the boundary demarcation or on-the-ground translation of the boundary has 
not been carried out. This involves the use of beacons, pillars, walls or other artificial 
features . These marks should be visible, inter-visible and difficult to be removed. 
They show travellers and soldiers when they have reached the boundary between two 
countries, which, ifthe map can be relied upon, can easily be identified on the ground. 
The demarcation of the boundary also sometimes involves making rigorous surveys, if 
the marks left during the delimitation survey had been removed. Furthermore, 
surveys are necessary for the location of points whose coordinates were fixed during 
the delimitation survey, and for the location and alignment of pillars. Some clearings 
are made along the boundary for the maintenance of the boundary marks and for the 
movement of immigration and customs officials and the police posted there, so 
preventing illegal crossing, smuggling of goods and evasion of justice. 
3. 5. The Scheme ofBoundary Definition 
The nature of political arrangements in and around Nigeria had a lot of bearing on the 
processes of the delimitation and of the demarcation of her boundaries. First, in the 
early period of colonial rule there were three separate colonies. By 1900, for 
example, these were three distinct entities: Colony, Southern Nigeria and Northern 
Nigeria (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989, p. 186). These colonies were collaborating in 
some ways, as they were all British territories; but they were administered separately 
and the question of boundary delimitation, though initially settled by the Colonial 
Office and the Geographical Section (General Staff) was resolved individually. 
Secondly, Nigeria was surrounded by non-British colonies such as Cameroon 
(Germany), later French Cameroon, in the east: Niger (French) in the north, Chad 
(French) in the northeast, and Dahomey (French) in the west. 
The first explains the way Nigeria's boundary delimitation was done by installments, 
as the boundary survey would terminate at the limit of a colony that arranged for the 
delimitation. For example, the Nigeria-Benin boundary, in spite of its relatively short 
length (692 kilometres) compared with the Nigeria-Niger boundary (1376 kilometres) 
was delimited in two sections. The sea to 9° N was around the northern limit of 
Southern Nigeria; the 9° N to the middle of the River Niger was in the sphere of 
influence of Northern Nigerian government. The middle of Niger forms a tripartite 
point for the boundaries of Nigeria, Niger, and the Republic of Benin. Other factors, 
such as the length of the boundary, difficulty of terrain, exhaustion of supplies of the 
boundary commissions, disagreement over the course of the boundary and the 
presence of big rivers across the boundary course also put a temporary stop to the 
delimitation survey work even before the territorial limit of the colony was reached. 
The second political situation, that of the nationalities of the commtsstoners, 
determined how the delimitation was carried out. For instance, there was the 
tendency for the British to be more prompt in delimiting and demarcating the 
boundaries of her colonies with the French colonies than with the German colonies. 
The reason can be found in Prescott's observation that "Britain always found it easier 
to reach a compromise with Germany than with France on issues relating to their 
colonies in Africa" (Prescott, 1971, p. 233). The sum ofthe political situation in and 
around Nigeria produced the boundary definition scheme illustrated in Figure 2. The 
figure shows the various sections of Nigeria's boundaries delimited by different 
commissions. 
Figure 2. The Scheme ofthe Definition ofNigeria' s Boundaries 
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Source: J. Thompson 1886. Niger and C.:entral Sudan Sketches. Scottish Geog. 
Magazine, 2 [no volume] [no number], [no page]. 
Figure 3 is the map of the area covered by Nigeria drawn in 1885. It shows no 
boundaries apart from the tribal frontiers. By 1900, all of Nigeria's boundaries had 
been defined by treaty as shown in Figure 4. By this time (1900), some of the 
boundaries had been delimited as in the case of Nigeria-Republic of Benin boundary 
(the coast to latitude 9° N in 1895-6 and latitude 9° N to the Niger, 1900), Nigeria-
Cameroun boundary from Sea to Cross River (1895). The Nigeria-Republic of Benin 
boundary was marked on the ground. The difference between a boundary that was 
defined by a treaty and one that was delimited through boundary surveys can be seen 
in the nature of the boundary line. The former is made up of straight lines and a 
geometric curve while a delimited boundary line is usually irregular, having been 
made in conformity with the reality ofthe situation around the boundary. Most often, 
the boundaries were made to coincide with river courses and crests of ridges, all of 
which served as natural boundaries. They were also made to avoid, as much as 
possible, the division of settlements or separation of villages and their farmlands . 
Figure 3. Nigeria Without Boundaries in 1885 
Source: J. Thompson 1886. Niger and Central Sudan Sketches. Scottish Geog. 
Magazine, 2 [no volume] [no number], [no page]. 
As Nigeria has common borders with four countries, the development of Nigeria's 
boundaries is discussed in four sections. The first is the Nigeria-Benin (formerly 
Dahomey) Boundary. The second is the Nigeria-Niger Boundary. The third is the 
Nigeria-Cameroun Boundary. The fourth is the Nigeria-Chad Boundary. 
3. 7. The Nigeria-Benin Boundary 
The Nigeria-Benin boundary was the earliest defined frontier. It was treated in two 
sections: (a) the coast to latitude 9° North, and (b) latitude 9° North to the Niger. In 
next section I will analyse the coast to latitude 9° North. 
3. 7. 1. The Coast to Latitude 9° North 
It was claimed that the section from the coast to latitude 9° North was first defined 
in a treaty signed on 18 August 1889 at which it was a straight line as shown in 
Figure 5. In the treaty, the line was described as follows : 
On the Slave Coast, the line of demarcation between the spheres of influence of 
the powers shall be identified with the meridian, which intersects the territory of 
Porto Novo at the Ajarra Creek, leaving Pokrah or Pokea to the English Colony 
of Lagos. It shall follow the above-mentioned meridian as far as the 9° north 
latitude, where it shall stop (Hertslet, 1909, pp. 729-33). 
Figure 4. Nigeria Boundaries by 1900 
Source: Capt. C. H. Foulks. 1906. The New Anglo-French Frontier between the Niger 
and Lake Chad. Scott. Geog. Mag, 22 [no number], [no page] . 
When the boundary was delimited in 1895-6 following an agreement signed in July 
1893 on the conduct of the delimitation survey, it was found that the delimitation 
could not follow the stated straight course without shattering many villages and 
towns. Preference was given, instead, to the convenience of using various sections of 
rivers such as the Ajara, Amidu, Ibru, and largely, Okpara as a mutual boundary. 
Figure 6 shows the new frontier as part of the Nigeria-Benin boundary. The boundary 
delimitation was accepted at the Anglo-French Convention of 14 June 1898 and the 
agreement was signed on 19 October 1906. 
In 1912, an Anglo-French Commission was set up to demarcate the boundary and the 
British Commissioner, who was then the Director of the Survey Department of 
Southern Nigeria, and Captain Forum, the French Commissioner, signed the protocol 
on this exercise on 20 July 1912. During the demarcation, which was done with 
beacons numbered 1 to 142, some changes were also made. These changes were 
made because some survey marks and some villages such as Ikotun, Ilore, Oketo and 
ljalu were not located on the map. Some concessions and compensations were also 
made in respect of some villages to ensure their road communications with other parts 
of the colonies in which they were located. The final agreement, which was signed on 
18 February 1914, was silent about Article Ill in the agreement of 1905, which stated 
as follows: 
The villages situated in proximity to the frontier shall retain the right to use the arable 
and pasture lands, springs and watering-places which they have heretofore used, even 
in the cases in which such arable and pasture lands springs and watering-places are 
situated within the territory of the other (HMS Office, 1906, p. 13). This type of 
agreement is not far from guaranteeing endless border disputes between two 
neighbours, as each party has the legitimate rights to the resources at their common 
border. 






Source: Capt. C. H. Foulks. 1906. The New Anglo-French Frontier between the Niger 
and Lake Chad. Scott. Geog. Mag, 22 [no number], [no page]. 
3. 7. 2. Latitude 9° North to the River Niger 
The second section of the Nigeria-Benin boundary, that is, from the point of the 
intersection of the River Okpara with Latitude 9° North to the middle of the Niger, 
was included in the Anglo-French Agreement of 14 June 1898. The section enjoyed 
the benefits of the unusual pre-1900 familiarity of the European Powers with the 
territories they had shared by treaties. This section of the Nigerian boundary was 
therefore not described by one single straight line, but by series of lines as shown in 
Figure 7. 
However, the delimitation survey and mapping were carried out in 1900 and the 
demarcation was executed at the same time by cutting down alternate trees along the 
boundary (Brownlie, 1979, p. 188). The protocol was signed on 22 December 1900, 
but this section was again included in the 'exchange of notes' and agreement signed in 
Paris on 19 October 1906. The boundary agreed upon is shown as a part of the 
Nigerian-Benin boundary in Figure 6. The total length of the boundary line between 
the Republic ofBenin and Nigeria was about 696 kilometres (Hertslet, 1909, pp. 729-
33), before final approval. The length as now apparent is fixed at 770 kilometres 
(Abiodun, 1982, p. 3). 
Figure 6. Nigeria-Benin Boundary after Delimitation Survey 
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Figure 7. Nigeria-Benin boundary from Lat. 9° N to the Niger in 1898 
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Figure 8. Evolution of the Nigeria-Niger Boundary 
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Source: Capt. C. H. Foulks. 1906. The New Anglo-French Frontier between the Niger 
and Lake Chad. Scott. Geog. Mag, 22 [no number], [no page]. 
3. 8. The Nigeria-Niger Boundary 
The present Nigeria-Niger boundary runs from the tripartite point on the Niger River 
(that is, the point at which the boundaries between Nigeria and Niger, Nigeria and 
Benin, Benin and Niger meet) at Lake Chad, a distance of about 1490 kilometres. 
The boundary defines the northern limit of Nigeria. The map-based description in 
The Anglo-French agreement of August 1890 put the boundary as a straight-line 
running from the Bay on the Niger to Barrua on the western shore ofLake Chad (see 
Figure 8). A straight line is easy to draw on a map but a straight course is difficult to 
set out on the ground because of obstacles. However, that agreement merely denoted 
that the territory to the north belonged to France while that to the south belong to 
Britain. The boundary therefore assumed several interpretations in the hands of the 
British and French cartographers (Foulkes, 1906, p. 565). In June 1898, a second 
convention was signed. Even at this time, the country through which the new 
boundary line passed was hardly known. As a result, the new boundary, the starting 
point of which now moved south of the Niger was defined in "geometric terms" 
(Elliot, 1904, p. 505) as described earlier (see Figure 8). From the above description, 
it is clear that this boundary was drawn, in view of the lack of knowledge about the 
country, as a line of convenience that should have been fixed by astronomical 
observation and charted on the map easily. It was therefore devoid of consideration of 
the importance of the natural features and the cultural groups during the boundary 
delimitation. The reality of the situation started to rear its head when the French West 
Africans crossed the boundary, for lack of more suitable routes and water, to move 
from one part of their territory to the other. In response to a protest letter written by 
Brigadier F.D. Lugard, the High Commissioner of northern Nigeria, Lt. Col. Peroz, 
wrote as follows: 
Unfortunately, it is quite impossible for me to follow the advice which you tender 
referring to that of not holding or crossing the territories adjoining our mutual 
boundary. Perhaps you do not fully take into consideration that in such places as the 
delimitation of 1898 extends northwards, (to British advantage as far as all the 
country north of Sokoto and Bornu is concerned), such delimitation forces French 
territory back into a sterile country, where water is very scarce and where we cannot 
mark out to our own satisfaction a direction (lit road) which might suit us .. . I am 
convinced that the officers under your command do not have the same difficulties to 
face; thanks to the richness in provisions and water of the districts which fell to 
England's lot-None of these officers of yours will trouble themselves to dispute our 
right to this desert land where with difficulty we keep the few dams of stagnant water, 
which, together, permits us to retain in one, the several slices of the French so-called 
"Niger-Chad" territories, from the attacks ofthe Tornadoes (PRO, CO. 39254. 1901). 
The tone of Peroz' s letter indicates the type of animosity that existed between Britain 
and France over the boundaries of their colonies in Africa. 
In 1904, France was delighted to be compensated for her renunciation of her fishing 
rights in Newfoundland by being given a region south ofthe 1898 boundary line that 
ensured an all-season route from Niger to Chad. This arrangement brought the map-
based boundary line further south. But, before then, the delimitation survey which 
was under the leadership of Lt. Col. Elliot (British) and Captain Moll (French) had 
already started with the 1898 line. The survey, though nullified and invalidated by 
Article Vlll of the convention, which was signed on 8 April 1904, familiarised the 
British and the French with the political situation around the boundary. Both parties 
realised that the new line had cut through several districts, but the best they could do 
was to include a clause in the agreement that gave the people living near the boundary 
the freedom to cross the frontier in order to settle in any of the territories they might 
choose. There was a provision for the fixing of the boundary line by a joint 
commission "when the political divisions of the country was studied and the integrity 
of the lands belonging to the various tribes was respected" (Foulkes, 1906, p. 567). 
The realignment of the Nigeria-Niger boundary in 1904 did not go uncontested. For 
example, in a letter from the Resident of Sokoto Province, whose province was 
considerably reduced, to the Higher Commissioner of northern Nigeria, he stated: 
It appears to me that the proposed cession of Damagaram is likely to be a serious 
blow to the Protectorate. It might be possible to offer an alternative tract of territory, 
perhaps equally valuable to France, but of which the loss would be less serious to 
Northern Nigeria. The Beibei district, from Junju (French) or Unguan lliasu (British) 
to Nassarawa (British) seems to offer a possibility. It is a populous, prosperous 
district, in close touch with French towns of Junju and Karakara (Northern Nigeria, 
1904, p. 7). 
On 2 May 1904, Lugard wrote as follows: 
The large area of country ceded to French to the north of Sokoto gives them the 
district of Kiara, inhabited by the Asbenawa camel herds, and hence deprives us 
of the last remnant of hold over these valuable breeders of transport animals and 
stock. . .. It places upon me ... the most difficult task of informing the Sultan of 
Sokoto, whose dominion I recently pledged the good faith of England to 
protect .. . that promise is broken, and that a very considerable portion of his 
territory is to be ceded to France. Since the boundary is completely changed, it 
will, in my opinion, be necessary to have a new Boundary Commission (Asiwaju 
and Adeniyi, 1989, p. 195). 
Therefore, an Anglo-French Boundary Commission was set up later in the year. The 
two teams met on the Niger in December 1904. The British Commissioner was Major 
O'Shee of the Royal Engineers and Captain Tilho represented France. The two 
commissioners were experienced boundary surveyors, the former accomplished the 
demarcation of the Rhodesia-Mozambique boundary, and the latter was a member of 
the Commission that surveyed the former Niger to Chad boundary from 1902-1904. 
Fgure 9. Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary m 1893, Splitting Bomu, Adamawa and 
Marghi 
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Source: Capt. C. H. Foulkes. 1906. The New Anglo-French Frontier between the 
Niger and Lake Chad. Scott. Geog. Mag, 22 [no number], [no page]. 
One important aspect of the delimitation survey was the agreement that the new 
frontier should be fixed on the ground. By 1908, the Commission had completed 
work on the delimitation survey and the demarcation of the boundary. In all, one 
hundred and forty-eight beacons were established between 1906 and 1908. A 
description ofthe boundary was signed in Kano on 25 February 1908. The protocol 
on this was signed after Exchange of Notes on 10 February 1910 while the final 
approval for the Nigeria's northern frontier was signed in 1911 (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 
1989, p. 196). 
3. 9. The Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary 
The eastern boundary of Nigeria, up to the end of the First World War, separated the 
British colonies of southern and northern Nigeria from the German colony of 
Cameroon. Following the defeat of Germany in Cameroon by the combined efforts of 
French and British contingents, the territory was divided between Britain and France, 
whose colonies flanked the German Cameroon, (see Figure 9) at a meeting in London 
on 23 February 1916. Initially, there was a Nigeria-German Cameroon boundary; but 
after the war, an Anglo-French inter-Cameroon boundary was created. All these 
happenings around the eastern border created a change to the territorial extent of 
Nigeria and therefore caused modifications to the map ofNigeria. 
3. 9. 1. The Pre-War Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary 
The Nigeria-Cameroon boundary, a length of about 1400 kilometres before the First 
World War, was delimited in three stages. The first was from the sea to Cross-River 
Rapids. The second was from Cross-River to Yola. The third was from Yola to Lake 
Chad. The first Anglo-German agreement in respect of this boundary was signed in 
1885. However, the same 1885 agreement provided only a map-based description 
from a point between longitude 89° 42' and 8° 46' east at which 'Rio del Rey' entered 
the sea at the Cross River Rapids. This line was extended northeastwards to Y ola by a 
convention of July-August, 1886. In an agreement signed on 1 July 1890, a slight 
modification was made on the line from the coast to the Cross River, following the 
discovery that there was no river named 'Rio del Rey' . As a result, the starting point 
was adjusted to the head of the Rio del Rey Creek. Following the Berlin Convention 
ofNovember 1893 between Britain and Germany, an agreement was signed defining 
the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary from Y ola to Lake Chad. 
In all, the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon by 1893 had been defined to a 
point on the southern shore of Lake Chad, 35 minutes east of the meridian of the 
centre of the town in Kuka. The frontier was, but for the arc described from Y ola, 
almost a straight line (see Figure 9). Again, the boundary line showed no 
consideration for physical features or the ethnic boundaries. The Kingdom of Bomo 
was split into two parts. Similarly, Adamawa and Marghi were each divided between 
Great Britain and Germany. In this case, Yola appeared the only city given special 
consideration: hence, the arc was described with a radius of about 46 kilometres from 
Yola. 
3. 9. 2. The Sea to Cross-River Rapids 
The delimitation survey of the Anglo-German Nigeria-Cameroon boundary started in 
1895 with the section between the sea and the Cross River Rapids. This survey 
conducted by Captain C. F. Close (British) and Lieut. Von Besser (German), was not 
conclusive and the final survey was not carried out until 1905 and demarcation until 
1906. As can be observed, the delimitation of the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary was 
very slow. As a result, the Germans crossed the boundary frequently to take over 
important towns in the British territories. In order not to allow the situation develop 
further, the West African Association of Liverpool had to implore the British 
Government to settle the delimitation of the boundary so as "to preserve the valuable 
lands which belong to southern Nigeria which were in danger of being absorbed by 
the German Colony of Cameroon" (PRO, CO. 39254. 1901). 
3. 9. 3. The Cross-River to Yola Arc 
The section from the Cross River to Y ola Arc was a straight line on maps until after 
1901. Again, the delimitation survey by the British and the Germans did not start 
until August 1907 and the demarcation until 1923. Foil owing the completion of the 
delimitation survey in 1909, a protocol was signed on 16 April 1909. With respect to 
the demarcation, the protocol was signed in 1913. 
3. 9. 4. The Yola Arc to Chad 
On 12 December 1902, an agreement was signed on the procedure for the delimitation 
of the section from Yola to Chad. During all these activities, Lt. Colonel Lewis 
Jackson was appointed the British Commissioner while his German counterpart was 
Captain Glauning. Some of the important measurements made by the Commission 
were the positions of Yola, which was fixed by compromise as latitude 9° 12' 29.5" 
north and longitude 12° 26' 54.3" east, and the Yola Arc measured to be 128 
kilometres. Moving northward to Lake Chad, a discrepancy was settled regarding the 
shore of the Lake. Article VI of the agreement of 12 December 1902 made it clear 
that the high water mark would be considered as the shore of the Lake Chad. 
However, according to Jackson's letter of 26th February 1904, to the Colonial Office 
(Africa, 1926, p. 1049) the Germans had attempted to use the low water marks, which, 
if accepted, should have resulted in Nigeria's loss of the towns of Dikwa, Uba and 
Barna. The best the commission could do in this case was to chart the boundary line 
along the Lake using the two water marks and return to Europe, as they did in May 
1904, for the settlement. 
To resolve these differences, another conference was fixed for March 1906 in London 
to settle the disagreement. At the end of the conference on 19 March 1906, an 
agreement was signed that delimited the boundary from Y ola to Lake Chad at a point 
latitude 13° 05 'N and approximately longitude 14° 05 'E. Demarcation followed in 
the same year and was completed in 1907, but the final approval ofthis boundary was 
not effected until 11 March 1913, just over a year before the First World War, which 
considerably modified the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary. It does not require close 
scrutiny to notice that the boundary delimited (Figure 1 0) deviated considerably from 
the straight line that existed before 1903 (Figure 8). 
Figure 10. Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary from Yola to Lake Chad after the 
Delimitation Survey 
12 
.. ·· .. /1 
~., .... ,..- · ~ ..... _ ........ ····' ./!.' 
,. .... . 
,.,.: •' ,········---) .. .. ,/ : ; ,-............ _.,..,;- .... · · · · · ~,· .. ~· / .  
~.. !," 
,-' 
,· i ,, ... -: 
' 
/ . .' 
Source: Capt. C. H. Foulks. 1906. The New Anglo-French Frontier between the Niger 
and Lake Chad. Scott. Geog. Mag, 22 [no number], [no page]. 
The survey brought the commissioners close to the reality of the cultural frontiers. 
The need for exchanges of villages arose in order to avoid the division of the 
settlements by the boundary lines and to make use of the natural boundary features. 
Although effects were made to overcome the imperfections of the new boundary line, 
later developments proved that it was not to be the permanent frontier between 
Nigeria and Cameroon. Errors in fixing the positions of the places appearing on the 
late 19th century maps, such as the Perthe's German maps on which the boundary 
definition was initially based, placed some of the settlements under the wrong rulers. 
For example, Chikito was exchanged for Karua in order to use a natural boundary 
(River Faro). 
3. 9. 5. The Post-War Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary 
Germany lost her overseas possessions because of the First World War. Under 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace, she had to renounce her rights and titles over her 
overseas possessions. France and Britain, under the London Declaration of 1 July 
1919, consequently shared the German Cameroon, which was occupied by the French 
and British forces during the war. Under the Treaty of Versailles, this decision was 
recognised by the League ofNations on 22 July 1922 and the two powers were given 
mandates to administer the two divisions of the territory. That gave Britain more 
lands to the east of the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary, from the Coast to Chad except a 
section of the Yola Arc (see Figure 11). Under the treaty, the new British possessions 
were administered together with Nigeria and were also known as Northern Cameroon 
and Southern Cameroon. However, Northern Cameroon was separated at a segment 
of the Yola Arc. With effect from 26 June 1923, Southern Cameroon became a part 
of the Southern province of Nigeria while Northern Cameroon was a part of the 
Northern province ofNigeria. 
The new possessions of France and Britain introduced a new frontier between the 
French sphere of influence and the British territory. The line agreed upon in July 
1919 was delimited under the Treaty of Versailles in July 1922. The initial map-
based description was done on a 1:300,000 Meisel map of Cameroon but the map 
attached to the agreement was on the smaller scale of 1:200,000. Article 2 of the 
1919 Treaty emphasised the need to "lay down the frontier in accordance with natural 
features" (Northern Nigeria, 1904, p. 154). In 1930, the inter-Cameroon boundary 
was defined on the map in a protocol that was signed on 9 January 1931. A proper 
delimitation survey, mapping and an on-the-ground translation of the boundary line 
(demarcation) were embarked upon in late 1937. The project, that was estimated to 
last for six years, involved: 
(a) A framework of astro-radio points along the boundary at intervals of 
approximately thirty miles; (b) Preparation of topographical maps enhancing a 
strip 5-6.5 kilometres wide on either side of the boundary on a scale of 
1:125,000, increased to 1:62,500 in special cases where more details were 
required; (c) Demarcation of actual boundary line by pillars. The line was to 
follow natural features as far as possible, and monuments to be placed where the 
line meets or departs from them (on straight lines, monuments were to be placed 
at angles only); (d) A line of instrumental levels to be run near the boundary, and 
to be tied to every station; (e) Printing of map on a final scale of 1:100,000 
(Nigeria Survey Department, 193 7). 
Figure 11 . The Sharing of German Cameroon between Britain and France 
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Source: Capt. C. H. Foulks. 1906. The New Anglo-French Frontier between the Niger 
and Lake Chad. 
The Boundary Commission started work in November 1937 with a plan for the British 
party under the leadership of J.G.C. Allen, to carry out b, d, e above and half of the 
pillar installation in c while the French party was to undertake the pillar installation of 
the rest. By the end of that year, about two hundred kilometres of the 1600 kilometres 
of the boundary line had been mapped. However, the exercise did not go beyond 
latitude 5° North before the Second World War broke out in 1939. On 11 February 
1961, Northern Cameroon decided in a plebiscite to join the Northern region of 
Nigeria while Southern Cameroon united with French Cameroon. The line separating 
Southern Cameroon and Northern Cameroon became the international boundary 
between the two countries. 
3. 10. The Nigeria-Chad Boundary 
In the agreement signed on 29 May 1906 between France and Britain over British and 
French possessions to the east of the Niger, the Nigeria-Chad boundary was defined 
as follows: 
From this point (centre of the village of Bosso), it will run in a straight line to the 
point of intersection of the 13th parallel of north latitude with the meridian 
running 35' east of the centre of the town ofKukuwa, the meridian mentioned on 
14 June, 1898 and on 8 April, 1904 (HMS Office, 1906, p. 8). 
The frontier IS now described as a straight line from the 
Nigeria/Niger/Chad/Cameroon tripartite point (latitude 13° 42' 29" north and 
longitude 13° 38' east) the Nigeria/Chad/Cameroon tripartite point (latitude 13° 05' 
north and longitude 14 05' east). 
3. 11 . Conclusion 
One can observe the intensive cartographic work in relation to the delineation of 
Nigeria' s boundaries in the early years of colonial rule. The efforts were gradually 
reduced, though not because all the boundaries initially allocated had been surveyed, 
accurately mapped and demarcated. This can be explained by the fact that in the 
years of colonial rule, enthusiasm was generated by the imagined and anticipated 
natural endowments of the territories. Gains from most parts of the territories did not 
justify this enthusiasm and the European powers became less interested in boundary 
demarcation, especially after the Second World War, than they were initially. Even to 
the independent African nations, the boundary demarcation and maintenance are not 
regarded as an urgent matter until some economic activities start to take place near 
their common boundary or a military incursion is reported around their common 
boundary. Most villages near Nigeria' s boundaries did not feel the impact of the 
Nigerian government. The people living around the boundaries may sometimes be 
closer to their brothers and sisters who were cut off on the other sides than to the 
nationals of their own country. 
The incidence of clashes experienced along the northern part of the Nigeria-Benin 
boundary in April 1981, around the Nigeria-Cameroon border in 1982 and the 
Nigeria-Chad boundary in 1983 revived interest in the boundary issues between 
Nigeria and her close neighbours. General Gowen' s alleged action at Maroua in 1971 
and 1975 of giving away several square kilometres ofNigeria's territory to Cameroon 
(Ajomo, 1982, p. 138) shows that Nigeria did not, in the past, take the issue of the 
boundary delimitation very seriously. 
Figure 12. Scheme ofthe Definition ofNigerian Boundaries 
Initial Delimitation Marking on Protocol Final 
Treaties Surveys Ground Signed Approval 
l .Nigeria-Benin Republic (Anglo-French) 
a. The coast to Lat. 9~ - 3 20 km 
Aug. 10, 1895-96 1895-96 trees Oct. 12, 1896 Oct. 19, 1906 
1889 
July 12, Blazed-cairns June, 14 1898 
1893 
1 .. 1900 - Jan. 20, 1900 
2 .. - 1912 July 20, 1912 
b. Lat. 9~ to Niger--376 km 
1900 trees blazed Dec. 22, 1900 
& some cairns 
& Jan. 1905 
June 3, 14, 1900 Oct. 19, 1906 
1898 
2.Nigeria-Niger-1490km 
Aug. 1890 Nov. 1902 - Apr. 9, 1906 
June 14, 1898 Jan. 1904 May 29, 1906 
Apr. 8, 1904 
May 29, 1906 1906, 1907 Feb. 25, 1908 & May 17, 1911 
Feb. 19 1901 & 
July 1, 1911 
3 .Nigeria-Chad 1906 
(Anglo-French)-75km 
4 1898, 1904, & - -
1906 with 
Nigeria-Niger 
4. Nigeria-Cameroon (Anglo-Germany) 
a. Sea to Cross River rapids-224km 
29 Apr. /May 7, 1895, 1905 Dec. 1906 1906 Mar. 11, 1913 
July 1885, May 1905 
Aug. 27/ 
2, 1886 July 1, 
1890 & April 
14, & Nov. 15, 
1893 
b. Cross River-Yola Arc rapids-224km 
Nov. 5, 1893, Aug. 15, 1909 May 7, 1912 & Apr. 16, 1909 Mar. 11, 1913 
1913 
c. Yola Arc-Lake Chad-560km 
Nov. 15, 1893 Aug 10, 1903 1906-1907 Feb. 12, 1907 
Dec. 2, 1902 Feb. 3, 4, 4, & 5 Mar. 11, 1907 Mar. 5, 1909 
5 .Nigeria-Cameroon (Anglo-French)-1680km 
Feb. 6 23, 1916 1928 Jan. 9, 1931 -
July 10, 1919 1937-39 
July 22, 1922 Not completed 
Source: Asiwaju A. I. and Adeniyi P. 0 ., 1989. Borders in Africa: A Multi-
Disciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa, ed. Nigeria: 
University of Lagos Press. 
Figure 1 presents a summary of the progress of the boundary definition in Nigeria. 
Nigeria and Benin Republic (Anglo-French)-320 kilometres took place on the coast 
latitude 9° N, on 10 August 1889. The delimitation survey of the border and its 
marking on the ground was carried out in 1895 and 1896. The protocol ofthe treaty 
was signed on 12 October 1896 and it was finally approved on 19 October 1906. 
On 12 July 1893, an Anglo-French treaty was convened and there was no delimitation 
survey of the border. However, the marking of the border on ground took place in 
1895 and 1896. According to Figure 1 the protocol ofthis treaty was signed on 14 
January 1898 and the delimitation survey ofthe border was carried out on the coast to 
latitude 9° N, in 1900. There was no marking of the border on ground but its protocol 
was signed on 20 January 1900. In 1912, the marking on ground on the coast to 
latitude 9° N took place and its protocol was signed on 20 July 1912. 
As Figure 1 shows, the treaty between the two powers over the Nigeria and Niger 
border (1490 kilometres) took place in August 1890. The delimitation survey ofthe 
border was in November 1902, but there was no marking of the border on the ground 
and the final approval of the treaty was not made. Figure 1 indicates that the protocol 
ofthis treaty was signed on 9 April1906. Again, on 14 June 1898, another treaty was 
convened between the two powers. In January 1904, the delimitation survey of the 
border was carried out, but there was no marking of the border on the ground and the 
final approval of the treaty was not made. On 8 April 1904, another treaty between 
the powers was convened. The delimitation survey of the border was made and 
marking of the border on the ground was carried out, but the protocol of this treaty 
was not signed and its final approval was not made. On 29 May 1906 there was a 
treaty between the two powers and a delimitation survey of the border was carried out 
in 1906 and 1907. During those activities, the marking of the border on the ground 
was not carried out, yet its protocol was signed on 19 February 1901 and 25 February 
1908. As shown in Figure 1 the final approval of the treaty was on 17 May 1911 and 
1 June 1911. 
The Nigeria and Chad (Anglo-French) (75 kilometres) treaty was convened in 1898, 
1904 and 1906. A look at Figure 1 indicates that there was no delimitation survey of 
the border; no marking of the border on the ground; no final approval of the treaty and 
its protocol was not signed. Nigeria and Cameroon (Anglo-German)-224 kilometres. 
According to Figure 1 this treaty took place concerning the Sea to the Cross River 
rapids section, on 29 April and 7 May 1895. The delimitation survey of the border 
was carried out in December 1905 and the marking of the border on the ground took 
place in 1906. Its protocol was signed in the same year and the final approval of the 
treaty was made on 11 March 1913. There was a follow up treaty on 27 July and 
August 1885 and the delimitation survey of the border was carried out in May 1905. 
As Figure 1 shows, there was no marking of the border on the ground, its protocol 
was not signed and the final approval of the treaty was not made. As Figure 1 
indicates, several treaties also took place between the powers concerning the sea to 
the Cross River rapids section. The first treaty was convened on 1 and 2 July 1886, 
the second was on 14 April1890 and the third was on 15 November 1993. As can be 
seen in Figure 1, the delimitation survey of the border was not carried out; there were 
no marking of the border on the ground; the protocol was not signed and there was no 
final approval of the treaty. 
With respect to the Cross River-Yola Arc (224 kilometres) there was a treaty between 
the two powers on 15 November 1893 and the delimitation survey of the border took 
place on 7 May and in August 1909. On 16 April 1909, the protocol ofthe treaty was 
signed. On 11 March 1913, the final approval of the treaty was made and the marking 
of the border on the ground also took place in 1912 and 1913. 
As Figure 1 has shown, the Yola Arc-Lake Chad (456 kilometres) treaty took place on 
15 November 1893, the delimitation survey of the border took place on 10 August 
1903, and the marking of the border on the ground was in 1906 and 1907. According 
to Figure 1 the protocol was signed on 12 February 1907 but there was no final 
approval of the treaty. On 2 December 1902, there was a treaty between the two 
powers. On 3, 4 and 5 February 1907, the delimitation survey of the border was 
carried out. On 11 March 1907, the marking ofthe border on the ground took place 
and its protocol was signed on 5 March 1909, but the final approval of the treaty was 
not made. 
As indicated in Figure 1 the Nigeria-Cameroon (Anglo-French) treaty regarding the 
border of 1680 kilometres took place on 23 February 1916. The delimitation survey 
of the border also took place in 1928, but there was no marking of the border on the 
ground. The final approval ofthe treaty was not made, but the treaty was also signed 
on 9 January 1913 . On 10 July 1919, another treaty was convened between the two 
powers and the delimitation survey of the border took place in 1937 and 1939. As 
shown in Figure 1 there was no marking of the border on the ground, the protocol was 
not signed and there was no final approval ofthe treaty. On 22 July 1922, there was a 
treaty between the two powers, but the delimitation survey of the border was not 
completed, perhaps because of the departure of the colonial powers. 
As shown in Figure 1, on 14 June 1898, there was a treaty on latitude 9° N regarding 
the boundary of 3 76 kilometres. The delimitation survey of the border took place in 
1900 and the marking on the ground of the border was in the same year. The protocol 
of this treaty was signed on 22 December 1900 and in January 1905. On 19 October 
1906, the treaty was finally approved. 
The data in Figure 1 indicate that Nigeria' s eastern boundary, comprising the 
Nigeria/Cameroon and Nigeria/Chad borders, suffered the greatest neglect in respect 
of marking on the ground. The transition from a provincial boundary to an 
international boundary required another survey, and that to be supervised by Nigeria 
and her close neighbours. 
The section of the Nigeria-Benin boundary running from latitude 9° north to the 
middle of the Niger was not properly demarcated. The alternate cutting of trees along 
the boundary is not a permanent measure because there was no special attention given 
to its delimitation and demarcation. As can be seen in Figure 1 the various 
agreements signed by Great Britain and France on the various sections of the 
Nigeria' s boundaries can confirm this. It is difficult to translate a line on a map onto 
the ground. Therefore, without a proper demarcation with physical and visible 
materials, even the people living around the boundary may not be aware of its 
existence. 
A detailed study of all agreements in respect of all boundaries, the past and the 
present should be carried out and all the textual descriptions in such agreements 
should be translated on topographical maps. The delimitation survey records should 
be checked properly with a view to reconciling survey tracts with the various 
demarcations. The sections that have not been demarcated should be surveyed for 
demarcation. The whole process and its present lack of closure was band to create 
problems for the future between people living in the border. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the matter has became, a matter of concern for foreign policy. Whether this 
particular issue has been addressed in accord with Nigeria' s foreign policy principles 
will be explained in chapter 5. But first, in chapter 4, border disputes need to be 
defined. Whatever measures were taken the definition of Nigeria's boundaries has 
caused border disputes between Nigeria and her close neighbours. The issues have 
not only attracted the attention of the international community, but have also 
developed problems over who owns what, such as a portion of land. With these 
developments, greater effort is required in theoretical and empirical analysis of 
territorial disputes. 
Chapter 4: Border Disputes between Nigeria and her close Neighbours 
Having outlined the principles that have guided Nigeria's overall foreign policy, this 
chapter turns the specific policy towards border disputes. The chapter begins by 
considering a definition of the concept of a territorial dispute between states before 
going on to identify and analyse the disputes that Nigeria has been involved in 
between 1960 and 2003 . 
4. 1. The Definition of Border Disputes 
Scholars often examine territorial disputes from the legal perspective and document 
how, well-grounded the positions of contending governments are in international law. 
Yet, in many cases, agreement cannot be reached between the opposing states to 
submit their dispute to arbitration or a ruling before the International Court of Justice 
(Amin, 1981 , pp. 98-106, 124-9, 131-8; Brownlie, 1979, pp. 26-43, 99-109, 133-40, 
617-39). Whether governments will respect decisions based on international law 
ultimately depends on non-legal consideration, such as the country's relative military 
power or the strategic and economic value of the territory in dispute. 
A border dispute involves either a disagreement between states over where their 
common homeland or colonial borders should be fixed, or, more fundamentally, the 
dispute entails one country contesting the right of another country even to exercise 
sovereignty over some or all of its homeland or colonial territory. At least one 
government does not accept the definition of where the boundary line of its border 
with another country is currently located, whereas the neighbouring government takes 
the position that the existing boundary line is the legal border between the two 
countries based on a previously signed treaty or document. The scope of 
disagreement over the boundary line can range from a small section of territory to the 
entire length of the border. In all of these disputes the challenger does not question 
the existence of a border with the challenged, but only the legitimacy of where the 
existing boundary line has been drawn, as for example Tanzania-Uganda; Ethiopia-
Somalia; Moroccan-Algerian; Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute. 
Many governments have disputed their common border due to unclear and 
contradictory treaties previously concluded (Albaharna, 1975, pp. 196-238, 261-3; 
Kelly, 1980, pp. 98-106, 124-9, 131-8). Once again, one country may occupy the 
national territory of her close neighbour and refuses to relinquish control over it. A 
government may or not openly and clearly issue its own claims to that portion of 
territory but, instead, may support separatist groups who claim that the disputed 
territory should form the basis of an independent and sovereign state. 
In this category of cases, the directly opposed territorial interests of the challenger and 
challenged are very clear as the challenger seeks to annex her neighbour's territory 
and rejects any sovereign rights of the rival. In this regard, long-standing disputes 
over territory arise when there is no treaty or a set of historical documents clearly 
establishing a boundary line or where the delimitation of a border in a previous 
agreement is imprecise. In other cases, there is no past agreement serving as the 
common reference point for establishing where the boundary is located; instead, both 
challenger and challenged draw on their own set of historical evidence and 
documentation as to where they hold that the border should be. Indeed the legitimacy 
of the border may even extend to one country questioning the very existence of 
another country. These border disputes, with their militarised confrontations and 
outcomes constitute my primary database of testing the causes of the border disputes 
between Nigeria and her close neighbours. 
4. 2. The Border Disputes between Nigeria and her close Neighbours 
The somewhat haphazard manner in which Nigeria's borders were created by the 
colonial powers and had been accepted unwillingly by the leaders since 1960 have 
been demonstrated in chapter 3. It left a legacy that was susceptible to contest. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the border disputes between Nigeria and her neighbours are 
still a matter of daily occurrence. This chapter will analyse those disputes on a 
country-by country. Figure 12 provides a complete list of the the border disputes for 
the 43 years period 1960-2003. It thus covers the entire preiod from independence to 
the present. 
Figure 13 . Border Disputes between Nigeria and her close Neighbours, 1960-2003 
Year Case Reason for Dispute Mode ofResolution 
1966 Nigeria vs Benin Political Diplomacy 
1969 Nigeria vs Benin Political Threat ofFeree 
1976 Nigeria vs Benin Political Threat ofF orce 
1981-90 Nigeria vs Benin Political Diplomacy 
2003 Nigeria vs Benin Political Diplomacy 
1965 Nigeria vs Cameroon Territorial Diplomacy 
1971-74 Nigeria vs Cameroon Territorial Threat ofF orce & 
Diplomacy 
1975 Nigeria vs Cameroon Territorial Threat ofFeree 
1981 Nigeria vs Cameroon Territorial Diplomacy & 
defensive use of force 
1987-93 Nigeria vs Cameroon Territorial Threat of force 
1994-96 Nigeria vs Cameroon Territorial Defensive use of force 
2002 Nigeria vs Cameroon Territorial Diplomacy 
1976 Nigeria vs Chad Territorial Defensive use of force 
1983 Nigeria vs Chad Territorial Diplomacy 
1984 Nigeria vs Chad Political Defensive use of force 
1975 Nigeria vs Eq. Guinea Political Threat ofFeree 
1977 Nigeria vs Niger Territorial Threat ofFeree 
1989 Nigeria vs Niger Political Defensive use of force 
1998 Nigeria vs Niger Political Defensive use of force 
4. 3. An Analysis of the Border Disputes 
This thesis is concerned to establish the relationship between regime type and the way 
border disputes are handled. Twelve regimes have held power in Nigeria since 
independence in 1960. The heads of state are shown below in Figure 13 . For the 
purposes of this thesis the regimes have been categorised by their overall conduct and 
values as either liberal democratic or autocratic. These are generalised categories and, 
as we shall see, there are at times inconsistencies between the overall values of a 
regime and its specific conduct. This reflects the inevitable fact that regimes are faced 
with differing domestic and international pressures and unexpected opportunities that 
make total consistency unlikely. Further, no head of state is ever totally consistent 
with his (there have been no female heads of state in Nigeria) own values any more 
than any other individual. The best of democrats have an eye to maintaining electoral 
support even if it means compromising their values and even generals can weigh the 
cost of war in terms of lives lost as too great, despite the potential military gains. 
Nevertheless there are two clear-cut patterns to the Nigerian regimes. If nothing else, 
the way they came to power is symptomatic of their values. Some seized or 
maintained power by force, some were elected. There is also the difference in their 
backgrounds. The military nature of all the autocratic regimes of Nigeria explains 
their readiness to use force to resolve conflicts, as opposed to those with a civilian 
background. 
Within this chapter I define liberal democratic regimes as those that hold to elected 
civilian rule and accountability of their actions to the electorate. Competition and 
contest is institutionalised and managed through elections, the rule of law, 
negotiations, compromises, and acceptance of majority rule. As regards foreign 
policy liberal democracy means the espousal of the value of negotiation and dialogue 
before military action is taken and then only on the grounds that it is done in self-
defence and has the support of the nation and the international community. The 
democratic regimes policy of good neighbourliness emphasised peaceful co-existence 
and the primacy of diplomacy over coercive force . It does not of course rule out 
military action per se, but it makes it the action of last resort and only justifiable in 
very limited circumstances. The thesis predicts, therefore, that liberal democratic 
regimes will handle border disputes firstly by diplomacy, rather than by force or the 
threat of force. Force, if it is used, will only be with great reluctance and after all 
other means of resolution have been exhausted. 
By autocratic regime, I mean a regime headed by an individual who exercises power 
in an absolute and arbitrary way; who owes no allegiance of the necessity to civilian 
rule nor any responsibility to give an account of their actions to the electorate. They 
in essence believe they have the right to do as they see fit whether that be acting in 
their own personal interests or in the interests of the nation as they see it. As regards 
foreign policy autocratic means the willingness to use all means to assert their will, 
regardless of the cost. This thesis predicts, therefore, that autocratic regimes will 
handle border disputes in a very different way to liberal democratic ones. Not that 
they eschew all diplomacy, for at times it can achieve national or personal goals, but 
they do not hold on principle that diplomacy must come first. On the contrary, their 
instinct will be to quickly resolve disputes by a display of force, unconcerned about 
what criticism this may attract from the public or international community. 
The two regime types have a very different attitude to war and conflict with other 
countries. According to the Kantanian school, in a democratic state the general 
public opinion will oppose war due to the costs that the mass population would be 
compelled to bear, hence leaders who make decisions for war will be removed and 
replaced with more democratic individuals. Autocratic leaders, the Kantanians 
reason, do not hold power on the basis of election and therefore are unconstrained in 
pursuing a violent foreign policy (Geller and Singer, 1998, p. 85). Those who argue 
in favour of democratic peace offer two explanations in support of their hypothesis. 
One explanation hinges on the political culture of the democratic state, that is, on its 
non-violent norms. The other explanation focuses on the democratic political 
structure, that is, decision-making constraints. 
The first explanation offered by the normative school is that the decisions in a 
democratic policy are arrived at through consensus and compromise. The decision-
makers who resolve their disputes through non-violent methods at home display a 
propensity to apply a similar methodology when dealing with conflicts with other 
democracies. This quality of peaceful resolution of conflicts makes the democratic 
leadership more peace-loving as compared to their counterparts in autocratic states. 
As a result of the common values which democracies share, they tend to resolve their 
disputes through non-violent means. A second justification, based on structural or 
institutional factors, posits that the pressure of various groups on the government 
imposes certain restrictions on a democratic government regarding engagement in 
war. According to Kant, an absolute ruler could plunge his country into war and 
expect to be largely insulated from its effects in his everyday life (Layne, 1964, p. 
88). In part, this is to reiterate the special importance of democratic values and 
behavioural commitments among the elite. But political strategy and skill are also 
crucial : when a democratic regime is under strain and incumbent leaders equivocate 
on critical issues or miscalculate the balance of forces, their actions may precipitate a 
democratic breakdown that was not inevitable. 
Powell ' s cross-national analysis strikingly confirms this emphasis on elite choices 
and behaviour: indeed political violence is a product 'of the strategic efforts of small 
groups of political elites,' and 'reactions to violence by leaders of the major, 
contending parties are extremely important to the ability of democracy to survive 
violent shocks' (Powell, 1982, pp. 155-7). Where all major political parties and 
factions ' stand united against violence and terror, democracy survives; where political 
parties are divided in their view of violent actions and demands, especially where 
parties actively support or themselves organise political violence, the suspension or 
overthrow of the democratic regime is highly probable (Powell, 1982, pp. 157-
170). Moreover, military intervention rarely occurs where the major political actors 
remain committed to the democratic process, and where it is attempted it fails . 
The breakdown of democracy (by either executive or military coup) is commonly 
preceded by ' renunciations of the democratic faith by its elected leaders' (Powell, 
1982, pp. 155-7). 
Given such an accumulation of theory and evidence, it is hardly surprising that so 
many empirical analyses have demonstrated a close association between the level of 
democratic development, and stable democratic government. What is problematic 
is not so much the extent to which democracy has been successful, but, rather, to 
what extent the explanations advanced for its failures are valid, and to what extent the 
features of the development process that explain this democratic failure may in fact 
not be avoidable. 
To return to the hypothesis concerning the behaviour of regimes towards border 
disputes being dependent on regime type, it now remains to test it against the 
empirical evidence. There follows an analysis of each of the 12 regimes (see Figure 
5 .I) and their response to the 18 border disputes that occurred within the period 1960-
2003 . 
Figure 14. Nigeria's Liberal Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes 1960-2003 
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4. 3. 1. The Balewa regime 
Abubaka Tafawa Balewa was Nigeria's first elected parliamentary Prime Minister. 
By his election and overall policies and principles his regime can be called liberal 
democratic. How did he apply these principles to foreign policy and in particular to 
the border disputes of his time? Before the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967, 
the importance of border disputes was not recognised and considered by the foreign 
policy makers as a major factor in the determination of Nigeria's attitude towards her 
immediate neighbours in particular and other West African states in general. Their 
neglect of this seems to have arisen from an unwillingness to disturb the status quo 
with the associated risk of destabilising their neighbours. For instance, Alhaji 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, recognised the artificiality of the colonial boundaries and 
insisted that the boundaries should be respected and recognised "until such a time as 
the peoples concerned decided on their own free will to change or to merge into one 
unit". As a democrat he helieved that the use of force or undue pressure to bring 
about a change would constitute an interference in the domestic affairs of the 
neighbours which "could only result to political unrest for the future of this great 
continent" (!dang, 1973, p. 8, see pp. 118, 124, and 126-7). 
The neglect of border disputes could also be said to have been the result of an 
insufficient appreciation of the significance and implications of border conflicts for 
Nigeria's relations with her close 'neighbours' especially when they were perceived to 
be militarily weaker than Nigeria. Put differently, had the Balewa government 
understood that all the West African countries, including Nigeria's immediate 
neighbours, have a common economic and security destiny, it might not have allowed 
the fear of interference to override a common search for solutions to common 
problems. After all, there can be common efforts without interference if the efforts 
are predicted on mutual consultations. But this was not the case. 
4. 3. 2. Balewa' s policy towards Benin 
Several ethnic groups straddle the international borders between Nigeria and Benin. 
For instance, the Goun and the Yoruba in the South-east, and the Bariba and the 
Rausa in the North-east. The immediate post-independence era in the two countries 
saw the political leaderships exerting themselves to consolidate their hold on power. 
In early 1962, the two countries signed an agreement in Lagos, which established a 
common customs tariff between them and customs posts along their common border 
(Adedipe, 1976, p. 20). Outside their mutual diplomatic representation this was one 
of the very early attempts made to concretise official relations between the two 
countries. 
At about this time there were calls by this time from some elements in the Action 
Group Party of Nigeria for incorporation of the Y aruba-speaking areas of the 
Republic of Benin into Nigeria (Bach, 1978, pp. 81-92; Zartman, 1966, p. 115). 
Whatever the rational for the proposals, the fact is that they were not taken up 
seriously by the democratic regime. Balewa kept to the principle of uti possidetis or 
the sanctity of colonial frontiers mainly to avoid unnecessary conflicts with an 
African state. Rather than redrawing African boundaries along ethnic interests, he 
believed that colonial boundaries should be respected and, in the interest of peace, 
must remain the recognised boundaries until such a time the people concerned decide 
on their own free will to change them or to merge into one unit. The Prime Minister 
also warned against any attempt to bring about such drastic changes by force or 
through undue pressure since such interferences could only result in umest and harm 
the overall plan for the future of the continent (Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992, p. 244). 
The non-aggressive posture is a component of the democratic policy of good 
neighbourliness. He was following the 1964 Cairo resolution of the OAU Heads of 
States and Governments that protected the integrity of the post-independence 
international boundaries of African states, pleading that they be respected and that 
boundary revision can be undertaken only with the consent of the parties concerned. 
4. 3. 3. Balewa' s Policy towards Cameroon 
In 1965 a border dispute escalated between Nigeria and Cameroon in the Bakassi 
Peninsula. The people of Danare in Ikom Division of Cross River State of Nigeria 
and Boudan in Marnfe Division of Cameroon clashed over a piece of land near their 
common border. Balewa' s response was to avoid confrontation and to seek to resolve 
the dispute through bilateral negotiation, and other peaceful conflict management 
strategies. 
On the initiative of his government, the first joint Commission of Nigeria and 
Cameroon met in 1965 at Mambe to discuss and reach an agreement in respect of the 
border between the two countries. This was followed by another meeting held at Ikon 
in the same year. The actual marking of the border on the land was in process, but, 
unfortunately, the progress of this Commission was interrupted by the cnses m 
Nigeria in 1966 and so Balewa's government never arrived at a response. 
Overall, therefore, it can be seen that the liberal democratic regime ofBalewa' s acted 
in its border disputes in a manner consistent with its principles. Though he regarded 
Africa's boundaries as artificial he nevertheless respected them and would not have 
them changed except by the consent of the people. Thus confronted with boundary 
problems his first choice was to use diplomacy rather than force, as we would predict. 
4. 4. The Gen. Ironsi's Regime 
Following the disputed parliamentary election in December 1964-January 1965 and 
the outbreak of violence in the Western region in November 1965, young military 
officers intervened on 15 January 1966 to 'restore order'. Balewa and the Premiers of 
the Western and Northern regions were assassinated, but the coup was not successful 
and in the ensuing chaos General Ironsi, the head of the army, stepped in and took 
control of the government. Ethnic riots and mutinies quickly took hold however until 
lthe situation was one of civil war. 
As the civil war began the border issue with Cameroon was heightened around the 
coastal territory. Cameroon persistently protested that Nigerian troops had violated its 
territorial waters. How General Johson Aguiyi Ironsi's autocratic regime would have 
handled this border dispute was never put to the test since his Government also was 
toppled, by General Yakubu Gowon, on 29 July 1966. 
4. 5. Gen. Gowon' s Regime 
Ironsi was assassinated in one of the mutinies of Northern troops and Lt-Colonel 
Yakubu Gowon, the senior officer and chief of staff in Ironsi ' s cabinet, stepped into 
the power vacuum. Though in October 1970, Gowon announced 1976 as the target 
date for return to civilian rule, in 1974, he postponed it and never showed any thing 
other than autocratic tendencies. 
4. 5. 1. Gowon's Policy towards Cameroon 
Immediately after the war of 1967-70 the situation along the coastal border reached 
new dimensions when Cameroon used force to assert its authority. This resulted in 
the death of some Nigerians, arrests, intimidation and subsequent mass departure and 
eviction of Nigerian fishermen from the Bakassi Peninsula. Gowon' s response might 
have been expected of a non-democrat. 
Figure 15. The Map ofBakassi Peninsula 
Source: Afrol News. (2002). Available from : 
http://www. afro I. co miN ews2002/ cam006 _ nig_ egg_ bakassi. htm [Accessed 2 7 March 
2002] 
Gen. Gowan, addressing a Nigerian audience, insisted that he would go to war rather 
than leave the Bakassi Peninsula for Cameroon. However, Gowan's intention was 
restrained by his own Ministry of Justice. It advised the regime not to contest the 
legal onwership of the Bakassi Peninsula: "Every effort should be exerted to ensure 
that Nigeria does not show ingratitude to a sister country that stood by it during the 
civil war" (Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992, p. 141). This recommendation, according to 
Ate and Akinterinwa, succeeded in preventing a war from taking place between the 
two. Instead it led to the Maroua agreement between President Ahidjo and Gowan 
between 1971 and 1975. 
Thus, though he undertook negotiations to resolve the single border dispute of his 
regime, it was more by force of circumstance than preference and hardly undermines 
the thesis. 
4. 6. Gen. Murtala Muhammed' s Regime 
On 29 July 1976, Gowon himself was deposed in a bloodless coup led by General 
Murtala Ramat Muhammed. Gowon' s successor also spoke of a return to civilian 
rule, in October 1979, but there is no reason to take this as genuine. Muhammed 
showed no more signs of being a liberal democrat than Gowon as his clash with Benin 
proved. 
4. 6. 1. Muhammed' s Policy towards Benin 
Nigeria has a history of border disputes with Benin. In 1976, Benin claimed 
sovereignty over a village in Shaji in Sokoto State ofNigeria and changed the name of 
this village to Sein as well as preventing Governor Kangiwa' s entry into some 
Nigerian villages in the district. Muhammed threatened military action against Benin 
if such action was repeated and as far as is known, although there is no official 
documentation available, the Benin withdraw its forces. 
4. 6. 2. Muhammed's Policy towards Cameroon 
The border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon which developed during General 
Gowon's era continued during Gen. Murtala Muhammed' s regime. Under 
Muhammed's regime the Maroua accord, was renounced in the middle of 1975. Like 
a true autocrat Muhammed publicly denounced it and the Supreme Military Council -
Nigeria's legislative body under Muhammed, refused to ratify it. Muhammed 
asserted that its ratification would have endangered Nigeria's vital offshore oil 
installations, in addition to conceding to Cameroon Nigeria's claim to the ownership 
of the Bakassi Peninsula. Muhammed even threatened to go to war rather than accept 
such an "outrageous agreement" (Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992, p. 6). 
4. 6. 3. Muhammed's Policy towards Equatorial Guinea 
Towards the end of 1975 it was reported that some Nigerians were maltreated by 
members of the Jeun Marcha Con Macias, one of the private militias and security 
servtces established by Macias Nguema to sustain his dictatorship in Equatorial 
Guinea. Agitation over what should be done to Bioko dominated the Nigerian Press 
just as they had in the early 1960s. A section of the Press and the Nigerian Trade 
Union Congress called on the government to annex Bioko. Some analysts were of the 
opinion that Nigeria should have attempted to annex Bioko in the 1960s. Muhammed 
issued a strong warning to the dictator (Macias Nguema) about his maltreatment of 
Nigerians in Equatorial Guinea. Whether he would have heeded the cries to annex it 
is unknown since an abortive coup claimed his life in Lagos on 13 February 1976 and 
the domestic problems which accompanied it, diverted Nigeria from the Equatorial 
Guinean issue. His two years in office however had given ample proof of his 
willingness to threaten force as a first resort. As a military man he only thought of 
military action. 
4. 7. Gen. Obasanjo 's Regime 
Following the assassination of General Muhammed in a failed coup, Muhamed' s 
second-in-command, General Olusegun Obasanjo took over. His regime is difficult to 
categorise since in one sense he inherited military rule rather than chose it and he did 
in the end see through the process ofNigeria's return to democracy. The best method 
of judging therefore is by his works. 
4. 7. 1. Obasanjo's Policy towards Chad 
In 1976 there were Chadian armed incursions into Nigerian territory with attacks on 
Nigerian fishermen (Higgot and Fuglestad, 1975, p. 383). Relying on interviews 
conducted by the Nigerian Brigade Commanders serving in Maduguri province of 
Nigeria close to Chad, Jumare argues that most of the attacks were conducted by 
"breakaway units" of about 20-30 rebel Chadian soldiers, their motive being to disrupt 
and "get logistics". They were never part of an organised group. Nevertheless, Chad 
did officially complain that Nigeria had provided weapons for the Chadian rebel 
forces residing in the country as "refugees" and from there indulging in activities 
designed to disrupt the peace process and destabilise the government at Ndjamena. 
Another key issue affecting the security of the border region centred around the status 
of some islands in the Lake Chad region. The islands had been jointly claimed by the 
two countries owng to the fact that the border area had not been demarcated. 
Attempts by both parties to stake their claim by establishing effective control had 
resulted in armed clashes and extensive militarisation of the border area. Realising 
the frequency of the clashes between the two, Obasanjo, ordered the security agencies 
to take defensive measures along Nigeria's territorial waters with Chad (New Nigeria, 
1976). 
4. 7. 2. Obasanjo ' s Policy towards Niger 
Niger during Obasanjo's time carried out what Nigeria deemed as hostile and 
aggressive policies along the Komadugu-Y obe River and around the Lake Chad 
region (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989, p. 209). In 1977, Niger constructed two dams on 
the Rivers Lamido and Maggiya along Lake Kalmalo in Sokoto State ofNigeria. The 
construction of the two dams disrupted irrigation projects in Sokoto State (Olusanya 
and Akindele, 1986, p. 185). The damage, which the construction of the two dams 
had caused, made Obasanjo issue a warning to Niger. When there was no cooperation 
from Niger, he closed Nigeria's border with Niger. 
It is true that Obasanjo certainly used force on both occasions that there were border 
disputes, though in his defence it can be said that these were essentially defensive 
rather than offensive or threatening strategies. Nevertheless one notes the absence of 
serious negotiations either before or after the incidents that one might have expected 
from a democratic regime. Overall, therefore, Obasanjo was still working within the 
mind set of a military leader, although not one that was using violence rashly like 
some of the other autocratic leaders of Nigeria. 
4. 8. President Alhaji Shehu Shagari's Regime 
Between July and August 1979, Federal and State elections were held. On October 
1979, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was inaugurated President of the state, as the country 
returned to civilian rule. It was the first liberal democratic regime for 13 years. In 
September 1983, President Shagari was re-elected for a further four-year tenure. His 
regime certainly inherited liberal democratic credentials. 
4. 8. 1. Shagari's Policy towards Benin 
The most serious of the border incidents between Nigeria and Benin was a reported 
incursion into and occupation of the Nigerian villages of Tungan Goge, Gulma and 
Tungachi in the Ilo district of Sokoto State of Nigeria by Beninois soldiers in March 
1981 (Nwokedi, 1984 and 1985a, pp. 45-60). The Beninois ambassador in Lagos 
denied the story, but with widespread press reports about the incident received in 
Nigeria, the Nigerian authorities appeared to fuel speculation that they were 
contemplating a riposte. President Mathiew Kerekou of Benin sought a summit with 
his Nigerian counterpart. When Kerekou arrived in Lagos on 13 April 1981, Shagari 
secured his promise that Benin would not, under any circumstances, invade any part 
of Nigeria (Daily Times, 1981 ). It was a triumph of diplomacy. 
Boundary relations were handled by the Shagari regime under the framework of the 
Nigeria-Benin Joint Commission. It was this that recommended, after this crisis with 
Benin that the two states should establish a "neutral zone" along their common border 
and from which, all human activity was excluded (New Nigeria, 1981). In addition, 
to eliminate further incidents, the two states engaged in demarcating their 
international boundary. Shagari was happy to comply so as to avoid the use of force. 
4. 8. 2. Shagari's Policy towards Cameroon 
The 1981 border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon was the most acute and 
serious since independence and was a real challenge to the Shagari regime's 
democratic principles. Cameroon claimed sovereignty over eighteen villages in 
Enugu and the Bakassi Peninsula. Further, Cameroon unilaterally constructed a Dam 
on the upper reaches of the Benue River, which normally serves fishermen and 
farmers in Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. With the construction of the dam, 
fishing and agricultural activities in Nigeria's Gongola State were adversely affected. 
When the situation was becoming explosive, President Shagari considered not 
military action, but redress in the International Court of Justice, while he also brought 
the idea of a Nigeria-Cameroon two-man observatory team to determine the problems 
caused by the diversion of the Kalia River (called E 1 Beid on the Cameroonian side) 
(National Concord, 1982, pp. 1, 24; Nigeria Call, 1982, p. 16). Once more 
negotiation and diplomacy prevailed over military solutions. 
On 16 May 1981 fresh tension arose between Nigeria and Cameroon in the Bakassi 
Peninsula. The threat was such that Shagari felt obliged for defensive reasons to send 
500 soldiers to protect its people in the region. Furthermore, troops were sent after 
lbibio fishermen complained of incessant extortions, attacks and beatings made on 
them by Cameroonian police. The troops were deployed to the west of the peninsula 
and were, in mid-February 1982 doubled in number. Unfortunately diplomacy was 
unable to resolve the issue and fishermen died in clashes. Eventually the unresolved 
situation led to an open confrontation between the two forces in which five Nigerian 
soldiers were reported killed and three others seriously wounded (Day, 1982, p. 97, 
Shaw and Aluko, 1983, p. 182, Yedder, eta/. , 1983-4, p. 119). 
There were immediate demands from Nigeria that Cameroon should apologise, pay 
damages and punish those soldiers involved. These demands also mentioned 
reconsideration of border agreements made between the Cameroon government and 
the previous military government of Nigeria. In Cameroon, it being itself an 
autocratic regime, there was no official mention of the incident. But Nigerian radio, 
easily heard in Cameroon, made no secret of the business and the rumour market in 
Cameroon was very active. Cameroon' s policy was to keep the event as quiet and 
low-key as possible, preferring to settle it quickly and without great stress; and 
without allowing Cameroonian public opinion to become a factor in the settlement of 
the dispute. Nigerian policy was quite the opposite, with the government calling in 
the world press and in Nigerian radio stations (government-controlled) calling for 
severe penalties for Cameroon, including the use of military force. The Nigerian 
press, which is not government-controlled, called for revenge and made extremely 
insulting statements regarding Cameroon's leaders. Even after Cameroon apologised 
and agreed to pay damages the pressure was kept up. 
Shagari emphasised the importance he attached to this affair by staying at home 
during the Organisation of African Unity's (now African Union) annual meeting in 
Nairobi. Besides, the matter had not been placed on the OAU agenda. Diplomats in 
Yaounde felt that war was very close, and Nigerian jets were ordered to buzz the new 
Cameroon oil refinery in Victoria. Shagari was not however prepared to follow 
intimidation with full scale war, even though the Nigerian press attacked his 
government for its cowardice. In fact, Shagari was using the military pressure as a 
means of bringing Cameroon to the negotiating table to renegotiate the border 
settlement reached between President Ahidjo and the previous military governments 
ofNigeria. In January 1981, during what appeared to have been an amiable visit of 
President Shagari to Cameroon, Shagari raised the issue of border renegotiation. He 
argued that the military governments had no legal right to have entered into such an 
agreement and that, therefore, it was null and void. 
On 1 August 1981, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Professor Ishayu Audu, announced 
that an international arbitration tribunal would be set up to resolve the border disputes 
between the two countries (Yedder, et al., 1983-4, p. 119). In the end therefore 
democratic principles prevailed. 
4. 8. 3. Shagari' s Policy towards Chad 
In April 1983 the two countries' forces clashed in the Lake Chad regiOn over 
fishermen ' s access to the waters. These unfortunate incidents, which were reported in 
the world press and West Africa, put the losses at 9 Nigerians and 75 Chadians with 
20 Nigerians and 32 Chadians captured (Enchill and Nii, 1983, pp. 305-7). Shagari 
did not resort to force to resolve the problem. Instead the situation was brought under 
control by the Ahuja Peace Meeting of July 1983 . By this agreement both sides 
decided to revive the joint border patrols which had lapsed and to have the four-nation 
Lake Chad Basin Commission take up border security issues and demarcate their 
common borders. 
Following on from 13 years of autocratic rule Shagari ' s handling of border disputes 
makes a strong contrast to his autocratic predecessors. His restraint and willingness to 
seek peaceful settlements of problems was marked and persistence. If the use of 
military intimidation in the Cameroon dispute is an aberration it perhaps can be 
explained in terms of the domestic pressure he was under to a degree that autocrats no 
nothing of in their isolation. It was not the democratic way but to be fair to him he 
was using it to bring the democratic process of negotiation back on track. Certainly 
the degree to which it was a failure of democratic principles does not undermine the 
overall assessment that his was a liberal democratic regime that treated border 
disputes in a liberal democratic manner. 
4. 9. Gen. Buhari' s Regime 
On 13 December 1983, Nigeria's liberal democracy was blown away as General 
Muhammed Buhari seized power through a military coup. 
4. 9. 1. Buhari' s Policy towards Chad 
While there was by the beginning of Buhari ' s regime a general acceptance of the 
border status of some islands in the Lake Chad region by the close neighbours, the 
actual determination of the boundary on the ground was still disputed. The consensus 
was that even if the location ofthe two tripoints was precisely determined previously, 
the marking had not been maintained and there was no indication that marker buoys 
were placed to show the boundaries over the waters of Lake Chad. The demarcation 
of the land sector over the Archipel de Bogomerol had never been done. And yet 
Lake Chad was a vital economic life-line to all the region' s nationalities. 
Attempts had been made in the early 1970s by the Lake Chad Commission to 
demarcate the Nigeria/Chad boundary as a part of the field completion exercise of 
1/50,000 Topo Mapping, later undertaken by the Director of the Overseas Survey 
(Bach, 1980, pp. 264-5). This exercise had been stalled by the incessant conflict 
among the various Chadian factions in the civil war. The breakdown of security in 
the area and the heightened tension led to a series of skirmishes between the two 
countries. The worst of these was that reported under Shagari ' s regime in 1983, 
though the situation had been calmed by the Abuja Peace Meeting. 
The 1983 conflict had exposed the inadequacies of the security arrangements in the 
Lake Chad border region. The topographical configuration of the basin compels the 
inhabitants to move from one area to the other. The lake is surrounded by several 
islands which appear and disappear depending on the level of the waters of the Lake. 
One of the crucial recommendations made after the eruption of the conflict was the 
establishment of Joint Nigeria/Chad Border Patrol Teams, consisting of security 
forces from both sides with the responsibility of overseeing the security of the area in 
order to prevent the activities of the Chadian rebel groups. It was not until after the 
meeting ofthe Security Sub-Commission of 6th to 8th August, 1985 in Maduguri that 
an acceptable definition of a patrol zone was arrived at, namely "the quadrilateral 
formed by the lines joining the four patrol bases of Baga Sola (Chad), Blangura 
(Cameroon), Bga Kauwa (Nigeria) and Gadera (Niger)". 
One of the reasons for the volatility of this borderland area, especially after 1983, was 
the repeated attempts by each party to establish firm occupancy of those islands that 
they believed belonged to them. The matter was the more important because of the 
fishery resources for which the area is famous and on which so many people of both 
countries depended. In fact, in the attempt to control more of the fishing grounds, 
local conflicts have erupted between the Nigerian and the Chadian fishermen. The 
resources of Lake Chad are exploited as if the waters of the lake are international. 
The Lake Chad Basin Authority therefore had the role of determining the parameter 
governing economic activities in the lake's waters. 
Meanwhile the ongoing political crisis in Chad led to border disputes due to the mass 
influx of refugees from Chad to Nigeria. It should be noted that the boundary 
between Nigeria and Chad lacks clear demarcation in sections and has caused several 
cross-border incidents. In April 1984, Buhari without warning or agreement closed 
Nigeria' s border with Chad in order to prevent the feared mass influx of refugees 
from Chad to Nigeria. It can be categorised as the use of force defensively. This one 
border dispute in his term in office is hardly conclusive but it is enough to suggest that 
as an autocrat he had little time for the niceties of democratic diplomacy. 
4. 10. Gen. Babangida' s Regime 
On 27 August 1985, General Buhari was overthrown in a palace coup led by General 
Ibrahim B. Babangida, like Buhari spoke of returning Nigeria to democracy but his 
delays and final annulment of an election in which he appeared to low showed his true 
colours. 
4. 10. 1. Babangida' s Policy towards Cameroon 
Nigeria had alleged that Cameroon had effectively annexed some fishing villages 
along the two creeks leading to Cross River State ofNigeria's border. Tensions along 
the frontier continued, and in May 1987 Cameroon gendarmes occupied sixteen 
border villages in Borne State of Nigeria. Babangida had no time for negotiation. 
Instead the Nigerian National Security Council directed the Governors of all the 
States that share borders with Cameroon "to take military reprisal against any attacks 
along Nigeria's common borders with Cameroon". 
After this clash with Cameroon, the Nigerian army intensified its border patrols and 
considered stationing permanent units on the frontiers. In order to avoid future 
clashes between the two close neighbours, President Paul Biya of Cameroon 
delegated Ibrahim Mbombo, his Information and Cultural Minister, to negotiate with 
Babangida, but despite this tension remained high between the two countries up to 
October 1989 (Africa Research Bulletin, 1987, p. 8721). 
In 1990 the boundary demarcation was still in process, and minor clashes between 
border residents and transients continued. Deeper divisions were apparent when 
Yaounde media charged Nigerian agitators with instigating illegal demonstrations in 
Bamenda and at Yaounde University in May 1990 and with seeking to incite a 
popular revolt; the Nigerian media made counter-charges that Nigerians were being 
harassed, detained, tortured or murdered by Cameroonian security forces. In 1992, 
Babangida' s government published an official map locating the Bakassi Peninsu~a in 
Nigerian territory for the first time. This was followed by an introduction of armed 
troops to the disputed area on 21 December 1993 in a threatening deployment. In 
other words he was not prepared to negotiate. 
4. 10. 2. Babangida' s Policy towards Niger 
A clash occurred between the soldiers of the two countries near the border in Bomo 
State of Nigeria in May 1989 when Nigerian soldiers and immigration officials were 
investigating reported crop damage by a cattle herd from Niger. Nigeria therefore 
closed its border with Niger. When cross-border armed incursions into the north-
eastern zone of Nigeria by armed militants from the Republic of Niger began, Gen. 
Babangida ordered the military to crack down any found in Borno State villages. 
Furthermore, he established an effective cross-border defensive security system along 
Nigeria and Niger border. His cross-border security system prevented the flow of 
goods and services across the two neighbours' shared border, but it brought the 
incursions to a halt. 
Babingida was clearly a complex man politically. Though he came to power by force 
it was he who was to resign in 1993 to allow a civilian to become head of state. The 
same ambiguity is to be found in his policy towards border disputes. No one doubts 
the right to use force to defend territory when there are incursions from a 
neighbouring state, although his deployment of troops on the Cameroon border ended 
up looking more threatening than defensive. What does however seem to be lacking, 
however, is any attempt to enter into dialogue first or at least alongside the use of the 
military. 
4. 11. Shonekan' s Regime 
After Babangida lost poplar and military support following his annulment of the 1992 
elections, he was forced to hand over in August 1993 to a prominent non-partisan 
businessman, Ernest Shonekan. Shonekan was to be an "interim civilian President" 
until new presidential elections could be held later that year. Yet the interim 
government lasted for only three months before the Defence Minister in Babangida' s 
regime, 4. 12. General Sani Abacha seized power in a coup and assumed control of 
the Federal Military Government. In that short time his regime did not experience any 
border disputes. 
4. 12. Gen. Abacha's Regime 
No one can doubt that Abacha was a full grown autocrat; perhaps the worse to occupy 
the office of head of state since Nigeria's independence. In domestic politics he was 
ruthless towards his enemies and indifferent to the people. How did his values 
translate to the border dispute scene? Strangely he found a lot of his time engaged 
with the International Court of Justice seeking to resolve matters. 
4. 12. 1. Abacha' s Policy towards Cameroon 
On 21 December 1993 there was once more an open confrontation between Nigeria 
and Cameroon over Bakassi Peninsula. In the following months the dispute over the 
ownership nearly degenerated into a war between the two (Africa Research Bulletin, 
1994). On the 29 March 1994, Cameroon filed an application instituting proceedings 
against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice, contesting Cameroon's 
sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula. On 6 June 1994, Cameroon filed an additional 
application extending the subject of the dispute to a further dispute relating to the 
question of sovereignty over a part of the territory of Cameroon in Lake Chad. 
Abacha' s initial response was to send five hundred soldiers at the end of December 
1994 into Bakassi as a defensive measure. Though it did increase tension between the 
two countries it appears to have been a purely defensive response to protect Nigerian 
citizens in Bakassi Peninsula. It was not until 13 December 1995, that Abacha' s 
government responded to the International Court of Justice, filing preliminary 
objections to the admissibility of the claims of Cameroon. 
Only two months later on 3 February 1996 a clash occurred between the armed forces 
of the two countries after Nigeria claimed that Cameroonian authorities had forced her 
citizens in Bakassi Peninsula to register and vote in municipal elections. Back at the 
International Court of Justice, Cameroon, on 12 February 1996, asked the Court to 
indicate a provisional finding against Nigeria, for provoking the clashes between the 
forces ofthe two countries on 3 February 1996. In response, Nigeria on 19 February 
1996 placed a counter application with the court entitled "Cameroonian government 
forces Nigerians to register and vote in municipal elections". It protested against the 
organisation of municipal elections by the Cameroonian authorities in Bakassi and 
requested the Court to call the government of Cameroon to refrain from such conduct. 
In that application, Nigeria also asked the Court to warn Cameroon to desist froin 
further harassment of Nigerian citizens in Bakassi until a final determination of the 
case pending in the Court. 
4. 12. 2. Abacha' s Policy towards Niger 
From January 1998 there were cross-border armed incursions into the north-eastern 
zone of Nigeria by elements from Niger. Such attacks were frequent and destructive, 
covering areas not just within the immediate vicinity ofNigeria's northern and eastern 
borders, but also to the Middle-Belt region of Nigeria. Defenceless villagers and 
communities were the direct victims of such attacks. Many lives were lost, property 
looted, villages razed, cattle and livestock stolen, creating atmosphere of panic, terror, 
instability and insecurity in Nigeria. To put an end to the cross-border armed 
incursions into the northern-eastern part of Nigeria by elements from neighbouring 
Niger, Abacha ordered the troops that were stationed in the volatile region to attack 
the militants who attacked the villagers. In addition, Abacha established more 
effective cross-border security along the two countries' common border (Ate, et al. 
1999, p. 21). From 1993 up to his death in 1998, Abacha's strategy in the border 
disputes, especially, took the form of a massive introduction of Nigerian security 
forces to the borders, followed by the writing of notes to the United Nations Security 
Council, and the filing of applications to the United Nations (Doc.S/1994/228; 
Doc.S/1994/258; Guardian, 1996). 
It is difficult to accuse Abacha of acting like an autocrat in his border policy. The 
dispute with Cameroon was largely conducted in the International Court of Justice 
although largely in response to Cameroon's initiative. Further his use of force on the 
borders of Cameroon and Niger seem to be defensive and justifiable. Unless he was 
not convinced of the strength and reliability of his forces, he does seem to have been 
less aggressive than would have been predicted for an autocrat. 
4. 13. Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar' s regime 
Abacha died suddenly and unexpectedly in 1998, leaving General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar to succeeded him. His less than two-year tenure as a head of state was 
largely concerned with overseeing a transition to democracy in Nigeria. His military 
regime did not experience any border disputes between Nigeria and her immediate 
neighbours. 
4. 14. President Obasanjo 's Regime 
In the elections of 27 February 1998 the former General, Olusegun Obasanjo, was 
elected President of the country after fifteen years of military regime in Nigeria. 
After serving the full 5-year term he was re-elected on 29 May 2003. Since his 
military rule he had established himself as a democratic politician and it is interesting 
to examine how his second regime differs from the first in terms of handling border 
disputes. 
4. 14. 1. Obasanjo ' s Policy towards Benin 
Soon after his second term began, Obasanjo became exasperated at the Benin 
government' s lack of cooperation in tackling problems such as people trafficking and 
the smuggling of cars stolen in Nigeria into Benin. His response in early August 2003 
was to close the border with Benin in protest. He hoped that the action would focus 
minds. And this seems to have been the case. The following week he held a summit 
meeting with Benin' s President, Mathieu Kerekou, at which the Nigerian leader 
extracted pledges of stronger cooperation. Kerekou's reward was that the border was 
reopened. It was strong politics but it was not undemocratic and was better than 
involving the military. 
4. 14. 2. Obasanjo ' s Policy towards Cameroon 
In September 2002 the heads of states of Nigeria and Cameroon met in Paris and 
negotiated possible solutions to the two neighbours' long standing border disputes. 
However, tension mounted between Nigeria and Cameroon on 10 October 2002, when 
the International Court of Justice awarded sovereignty of the oil-rich Bakassi 
Peninsula to Cameroon. The International Court of Justice's ruling that Nigeria 
should "expeditiously and without condition withdraw its administration and military 
or police forces from the area of Lake Chad falling within Cameroonian sovereignty 
and from the Bakassi Peninisula" appeared offhand to Obasanjo and was rejected on 
the grounds that the colonial demarcation of Bakassi is not acceptable (Guardian, 
2002, p. 8). However, with the help of the United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan in 2003, President Obasanjo and the Cameroonian President, Paul Biya, were 
able to resolve some of their disputes through bilateral negotiation and other peaceful 
conflict management strategies. 
4. 15. Conclusion 
So far therefore there is little reason to deny that Obasanjo' s democratic regime is 
acting democratically with regard to border disputes. His reaction to the findings of 
the International Court of Justice, which he had earlier committed himself to abiding 
by, was disappointing but it in part reflected domestic pressures and opinion, which as 
an elected leader he was not in a position to disregard. Negotiation is clearly his 
preferred method, but like any good politician he is looking for a settlement that he 
can sell to his domestic audience. The pre-eminence of negotiation is of course a 
contrast with his rule as a military leader. Then though he only used force 
defensively, there was nevertheless an absence of serious negotiations either before or 
after the incidents. It can be argued therefore that his change of politics led to a 
change in his policy towards border disputes as the thesis would predict. 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis set out to establish the relationship between regime type in Nigeria and the 
way border disputes are handled. The twelve regimes that have held power since 
independence were categorised by their overall conduct and values as either liberal 
democratic or autocratic. The thesis predicted that liberal democratic regimes would 
handle border disputes primarily by diplomacy, rather than by force or the threat of 
force. Force would only used be with great reluctance and after all other means of 
resolution had been exhausted. On the other hand, the thesis predicted that autocratic 
regimes would handle border disputes in a very different way to liberal democratic 
ones. Not that they would eschew all diplomacy, for at times it can achieve national 
or personal goals, but they would not hold on principle that diplomacy must come 
first. On the contrary, their instinct would be to quickly resolve disputes by a display 
of force, unconcerned about what criticism this may attract from the Nigerian public 
or international community. The evidence has been summarised in Figure XX. 
Figure XXX. Border dispute responses 
Nature of dispute All Liberal Democratic Autocratic 
Response Regimes Regimes Regimes 
Diplomacy 9 (45%) 7 (88%) 2 (16%) 
Threat of force 5 (25%) 0 5 (42%) 
Aggressive use 0 0 0 
of force 
Defensive use 6 (30%) 1 (12%) 5 (42%) 
of force 
Total of responses 20 (100%) 8 (100%) 12 (100%) 
As the figure XX shows, eighteen border disputes were found to have occurred in the 
period 1960-2003, 7 under liberal democratic regimes and 11 under autocratic 
regimes. In fact only three regimes did not experience them (namely Ironsi, Shonekan 
and Abubakar, none of whom was in office more than a year) and that was owing to 
their brevity. In other words, border disputes have been endemic in Nigeria ' s history 
for 40 years. The disputes can also be analysed by head of state as Figure YYY 
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In analysing the responses we are dealing with twenty responses to the 18 conflicts, 
since in two instances regimes used two distinct types of response in the same 
dispute (namely Shagari and Abacha towards Cameroon; both using defensive force 
and diplomacy). Taking the overall pattern of response irrespective of regime type 
to border disputes, 9 (45%) were handled with diplomacy, 5 (25%) used the threat 
of force, 6 (30%) used force defensively, and none used force aggressively. Thus, 
though no regime regarded a border conflict in and of itself sufficient as grounds to 
go to war, the levels of response differed markedly and fairly evenly across the 
spectrum from negotiation to force. It is only when the figures are disaggregated 
into regime type that we see a striking difference. 
Taking the liberal democratic regime response pattern, namely that of Balewa, 
Shagari and Obasanjo II, of the 8 recorded responses, in 7 (88%) cases diplomacy 
was used and in only 1 (12%) case was defensive force used (Shagari as regards 
Cameroon). None used force aggressively or threatened force. 
Just how remarkably distinct the liberal democratic pattern appears when it is 
contrasted with the autocratic responses. There 12 autocratic responses recorded, 2 
(16%) cases used diplomacy, 5 (42%) cases saw force threatened and 5 (42%) cases 
saw force was used defensively. The contrast with the liberal democratic regimes 
could hardly be more stark. It is evident that regime type does indeed shape policy 
towards border disputes. Democratic regimes are a force for peace despite the 
persistence of issues that have the potential to cause violent conflict. No liberal 
democratic regime misused its armed forces and clearly preferred the way of 
negotiation. Given that the history of the borders themselves, as the thesis has 
shown, has left a legacy of unresolved problems, future crises can be anticipated 
with the same frequency as the past thirty years. As the study has shown, past 
disputes have concerned the imprecise nature of the boundaries, the use of the 
existing natural resources laying in the common border, such as the sharing of Lake 
Chad (Nwokedi, 1985b, p. 47) and mal-treatment ofNigerian communities residing 
in her neighbouring countries by the security agents of her immediate neighbours. 
Unfortunately most of these still remain unsettled to this day. But what has changed 
on the African continent is the arrival in the 1990s of liberal democratic regimes. 
Many have commented on the weakness and formal nature of their quality, 
including that ofNigeria' s democracy. But as the Nigerian case proves, even when 
democracy is far from handing significant power to the people and when there is 
still only limited accountability, nevertheless the acceptance of even a minimum of 
democratic values does make a difference on the international stage in terms of 
reducing conflict. This is good news for the continent. 
The significance of the nature of the regime handling a conflict does not of course 
just apply to Nigeria, but also to the country with which it is in dispute. Certainly 
one would expect Nigeria to find it easier to deal with disputes using negotiation if 
the other party is also so inclined. Although the data presented cannot conclusively 
prove this, it is worth noting that both Balewa and Obaanjo II were dealing with 
formally liberal democratic disputes when they negotiated with Benin and 
Cameroon. This is not to distract from their achievement. On the contrary it 
enhances the thesis that democratic regimes will turn first to diplomacy. Where 
both parties are of like mind a successful agreement is most likely. The findings of 
this study do lend support to the democratic-peace theory's argument that 
democratic states are less likely to go to war against other democratic regimes 
(Baldwin, 1993; Kegley, 1995). 
Though the thesis has focused on the nature of the regtme and its leader in 
determining the nature of the handling of border disputes, external parties played a 
part. Surprisingly, the OAU played only a minimal role. Founded in 1963 by 32 
independent Africa states, its founding Charter spoke of ' respect for the territorial 
integrity of each state' ; and of ' peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration'. On the basis of these principles it might have 
been expected that the member countries would not use force to resolve disputes 
and that the OAU would use sanctions if members did resort to force. And in 1964, 
at the second OAU summit, it passed a resolution on the Intangibility of Frontiers, 
which stated that 'all member states pledge to respect the borders existing on the 
achievement of national independence' . Yet, for many, this was not a statement that 
encouraged peace, but one that was seen as a frustration of their attempts to resolve 
'unfair' and unresolved borders inherited at independence. The end result was that 
the OAU became a toothless authority as regards resolving border disputes. The so 
called 'trade union of dictators ' was seen as the preserver of the status quo and not 
as the place to go to bring constructive change to borders. 
Ad hoc groups in Africa, however, played a part: Shagari turned to an international 
arbitration tribunal to assist with the Cameroon dispute (Yedder, et al., 1983-4, p. 
119) and used with effect the four-nation Lake Chad Basin Commission to alleviate 
problems in that area. But it was international arbitration based outside of Mrica 
that proved the more effective. In particular, the role of the International Court of 
Justice was important on two occasions. Abacha may not have thought of going to 
the Court over the Cameron crisis himself, but he willingly engaged in the process 
in 1994. An application by Cameroon instituting proceedings against Nigeria over 
the Bakassi Peninsula and over a part of the territory of Cameroon in Lake Chad 
area brought a robust counter-claim by Abacha's government in 1995. And the 
military clashes of both sides in 1996 brought both to the Court again that year. The 
Court may not have solved the problem but it certainly helped to defuse some ofthe 
military activity. 
Obasanjo also turned to the Court in 2002 after bi-lateral negotiations between 
Cameroon and Nigeria in Paris over the Bakassi achieved little. Obasanjo, however, 
was not prepared to accept in full the Court's ruling in October 2002, that Bakassi 
Peninsula belonged to Cameroon and that Nigeria should withdraw its 
administration and security forces speedily from the contested area there and in 
Lake Chad. Yet the Court's arbitration was not a total failure since the contested 
judgement led to the involvement of the United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan. This finally brought forth the sought agreement. 
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